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ARTICLE
FISHER V. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN:
AN ANALYSIS OF RACE-CONSCIOUS ADMISSIONS
PROGRAMS AND HOW THE SUPREME COURT WILL RULE
By: Kevin McNelis
I. Introduction
More than half a century removed from the Civil
Rights movement, diversity remains a hotbed issue in
American society, particularly on college campuses. The
overarching issue presented in Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin is whether a public university can consider an
individual’s race in its admissions decisions. The answer
depends on how the Supreme Court will interpret the
Constitution in its upcoming term – notably the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which
provides that all United States persons are entitled to the
equal protection of the laws.1
Diversity has long been asserted as an important
factor in a college education. In fact, the Supreme Court
approved this belief in the 1978 case Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, where it held that
achieving a diverse student body is a compelling state
interest that can be satisfied by the use of race-conscious

1

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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admissions programs. 2 What the Supreme Court must
decide in Fisher is this: how does the University of Texas
at Austin’s affirmative action plan stand up next to the
standards the Court has established in and since Bakke? In
other words, is the race-conscious admissions program at
the University of Texas at Austin (“UT Austin”)
constitutional?
In this policy note, I will address the history of
Supreme Court decisions regarding race-conscious
admissions programs at public universities; I will also
analyze each justice’s tendencies and how their tendencies
could affect this decision. In doing so, I will conclude that
UT Austin’s program is unconstitutional. In its efforts to
achieve diversity, it considers race disproportionately
among other important factors, thus failing the standard of
strict scrutiny.3
II. Development of the Law: Supreme Court Decisions
and Standards
In order to prohibit racial discrimination in
federally-funded programs, Congress enacted the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. 4 Title VI of such law specifically
provides that no United States citizen shall be “excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination” based on his or her race.5 But
as the government made its move to prohibit segregation,
2

See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314–15 (1978).
However, race can only be considered if it is done so alongside several
other factors. Id.
3
See generally Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (stating
that strict scrutiny standard must be applied whenever racial
classifications are imposed by the government).
4
Overview of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, THE UNITED
STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/crt/title-vi-civilrights-act-1964-42-usc-2000d-et-seq (last updated Jan. 22, 2016).
5
42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964).
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an entirely different question arose as to whether public
universities could achieve integration by implementing
race-conscious admissions programs.6
In Bakke, the Court dealt with the University of
California at Davis (“UC Davis”) medical school’s raceconscious admissions program, which allocated sixteen of
one hundred seats of its incoming class to minority
students. 7 Because this allocation “absolutely excluded”
non-minorities from a certain amount of seats and because
it used race as the sole factor in achieving diversity, the
program was unconstitutional under a strict scrutiny
analysis.8 The Court found the program operated essentially
as a racial quota.9 Under the strict scrutiny analysis, the
program failed the narrow tailoring requirement; as Justice
Powell opined, it was not “necessary to promote [the]
substantial state interest” of diversity.10 Although the Court
struck down the UC Davis program, it made clear that raceconscious admissions programs, if done properly, could be
constitutionally permissible to achieve diversity within the
classroom.11 In fact, Powell expounded upon his belief that
6

See generally A Brief History of Affirmative Action, UCI: OFFICE OF
EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY
AND
DIVERSITY,
http://www.oeod.uci.edu/aa.html (last updated June 23, 2015). In 1961,
President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 10925. Id. One
provision of such order provided that government contractors “take
affirmative action” to ensure that no employee was treated differently
due to their “race, creed, color, or national origin.” Id. Superseding this
was Executive Order 11246, issued by President Lyndon B. Johnson in
1965, which prohibited employment discrimination based on “race,
color, religion, and national origin” by employers whom received
federal funds. Id.
7
CHARLES V. DALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30410, AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION AND DIVERSITY IN PUBLIC EDUCATION: LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
4 (2012).
8
Id.
9
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320; see DALE supra note 7, at 4.
10
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
11
Id.
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a constitutionally sound race-conscious admissions
program would actually benefit students.12
In the end, the Bakke court delivered a total of six
opinions,13 with Powell “split[ting] the difference between
two four-justice pluralities.” 14 In the 5–4 decision that
struck down UC Davis’ program, only Powell’s opinion
included the idea that the state had a compelling interest in
achieving a diverse student body.15 Accordingly, it came as
no surprise that race-conscious admissions programs at
other public universities remained relatively unaffected by
Bakke in the decades following its decision.16 It was not
until the Supreme Court heard two Michigan cases –
Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger – that the fragile
precedent of Bakke would be revisited.17
12

Id. at 314 (1978) (Justice Powell remarks that a school with a diverse
student body is advantaged by the backgrounds and experiences each
student brings. The diversity enhances the learning experience because
students are subject to new ideas that may better equip them in their
studies and future careers).
13
Id. at 269, 324, 379, 387, 402.
14
DALE, supra note 7, at 6. One of these four-Justice pluralities, led by
Justice Stevens, struck down the university’s racial quota on statutory
civil rights grounds. Id. The other plurality, led by Justice Brennan,
would have found the racial quota constitutional on the grounds that it
would right past wrongs in regards to racial discrimination. Id. Powell,
in reaching the same result as the Stevens plurality, found the quota
unconstitutional. Id. Therefore, in a 5–4 decision, the Court struck
down the University of California at Davis’ racial quota, but under
different reasoning. Id.
15
Id. at 7.
16
See John Valery White, From Brown to Grutter: Affirmative Action
and Higher Education in the South: What is Affirmative Action?, 78
TUL. L. REV. 2117, 2148 (2004). I say relatively because outright quota
system was declared unconstitutional.
17
DALE, supra note 7, at 8–10; see Paula C. Johnson, Grutter and
Gratz Synopsis on Affirmative Action, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL BLOGS
1, 1 (2009), http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/salt/files/2009/08/Grutterand-Gratz-Synopsis-on-Affirmative-Action.pdf. Similar to Bakke,
Grutter and Gratz both dealt with race-conscious admissions programs
at the University of Michigan Law School and undergraduate program,

10
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In Grutter, the Court subjected University of
Michigan (“Michigan”) Law School’s race-conscious
admissions program to the same strict scrutiny analysis that
it applied in Bakke. 18 That is, the program had to be
narrowly tailored in order to further a compelling state
interest. 19 Adhering to Justice Powell’s observation in
Bakke – that race can only be “one element in a range of
factors” – Michigan’s law school used race only as a “plus”
factor, allowing a more individualized review of each
applicant without his or her race becoming a defining
factor.20 The Court held that a program that considers race
only as a plus factor satisfies the narrow tailoring
requirement.21 Accordingly, the Court found the program
constitutionally permissible and distinct from that in Bakke,
respectively. Johnson, Grutter and Gratz Synopsis on Affirmative
Action, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL BLOGS at 1. The claimants in each
case alleged that they were unlawfully denied admission because race
was the predominant factor in the decision. Id. Both programs
considered race as one of the many factors that went into the
admissions decision. Id. However, the law school did so in a “holistic
manner,” whereas the undergraduate program did so within a 150-point
system. Id. In the latter approach, if one’s race was considered in the
minority, that applicant received twenty points. Id. The Court found
that this “placed too much emphasis on race in an inflexible,
determinative way.” Id.
18
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
19
Id. at 333 (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989) (“[T]he purpose of strict scrutiny is to ‘smoke out’ illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also
ensures that the means chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that
there is little or no possibility that the motive for the classification was
illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.”)).
20
Id. at 336–37; Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314.
21
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (explaining that when race is considered
only as a plus factor, an applicant can be compared holistically to
others, whereas a quota system based on race allows certain individuals
– like minorities – protection from that comparison); see Bakke, 438
U.S. at 317.
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despite several dissenting Justices’ aversion surrounding
the term “critical mass.”22
In Gratz, the Court ruled differently and struck
down the undergraduate program’s 150-point scale
approach, in which one hundred and fifty points were
available to applicants, but only a total of one hundred was
required to gain admission with twenty points being applied
if the applicant was a minority.23 This decision harkened
back to what Justice Powell opined in Bakke: that
admissions programs should individually assess each
applicant; no single characteristic, such as race, should hold
a fixed weight in regards to admissions decisions.24 The
Gratz Court decided that the system in which minority
applicants automatically received a 20-point award was not
narrowly tailored to achieve the university’s compelling
interest of a diverse student body, and thus failed the test of
strict scrutiny. 25 Grutter and Gratz collectively provided
the framework, that race can be used only as one of many
factors, for race-conscious admissions programs at public
universities. 26 However, Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Grutter foretold of a time – then “25 years from
22

Id. at 343–44. The term “critical mass” refers to the amount of
underrepresented minority students Michigan Law School desired to
enroll in order to attain the “educational benefits of a diverse student
body.” Id. at 330. However, no “number, percentage, or range of
numbers or percentages” can define a critical mass exactly. Id. at 318.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
have a problem with this classification. Id. at 379, 390. Kennedy,
particularly, denounces the concept as a “delusion used . . . to achieve
numerical goals indistinguishable from quotas.” Id. at 389. Rehnquist
and Scalia each label it as a “sham.” Id. at 347, 383.
23
Johnson, supra note 17, at 1; see Peer Caldwell, Defining the New
Race-Conscious Frontier in Academic Admissions: Critical
Perspectives on Grutter v. Bollinger, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 197,
200 (2006).
24
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 271 (2003).
25
See id. at 270–75.
26
See generally Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Grutter, 539 U.S. 345.
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now” – when the use of racial preferences would “no
longer be necessary to further the interest [of diversity].”27
Today, American society finds itself past the halfway
marker of O’Connor’s 2003 prediction, but the use of raceconscious admissions programs at public universities is still
a hotbed issue, perhaps now more than ever.
III. Current Policy: Fisher and How It Measures Up
In 1997, Texas enacted what is commonly referred
to as the Top Ten Percent law, which automatically admits
to public universities any applicant who “graduated with a
grade point average in the top 10 percent of the student’s
high school graduating class.” 28 Proponents of the law
argue that deserving and qualified applicants are ensured
admission.29 Those opposed to the law argue that awarding
automatic admission solely on class rank bars the
evaluation of other potentially qualifying attributes of
applicants.30 This poses a problem in and of itself, because,
since the enactment of the law, public universities in Texas,
particularly UT Austin, have seen an increasing number of
incoming freshmen enrolled through the Top Ten Percent

27

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
TEX. EDUC. CODE § 51.803(a) (West 1997); see DALE, supra note 7,
at 12.
29
Steven Thomas Poston, Comment, The Texas Top Ten Percent Plan:
The Problem It Causes for The University of Texas and a Potential
Solution, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 257, 267–68 (2008).
30
Id. at 260. UT Austin President William Powers, Jr. remarked that
relying so heavily on class rank ignores certain individuals who may
not necessarily be in the top ten percent of their graduating class but
excel in other areas. Id. (citing Holly K. Hacker, Class Rank is Low on
Many Colleges’ Lists: UT Admitting More to Make up for Law Some
Say Ignores Other Factors, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 2, 2007, at
1A).
28
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law.31 By 2008 – the year Abigail Fisher sought admission
– over eighty percent of UT Austin’s incoming freshman
class was admitted by way of the law.32
The question – at issue in Fisher v. University of
Texas – then became, how does the university fill the
remaining seats? It did so, and continues to do so, by
adopting a race-neutral approach that considers “essays,
leadership, awards and honors, work experience,
extracurricular activities, community service, and special
circumstances such as socioeconomic status or family
responsibilities.” 33 A few years before Abigail Fisher
applied for admission to UT Austin, however, the
university added race and ethnicity to those criteria. 34
When Fisher was denied admission, she sued, alleging that
the university had already acquired a “critical mass” of
minority students by way of the Top Ten Percent law and
that there was no reason to consider race on top of that.35
But what is a critical mass?36 During the district
court’s hearing of Grutter, Erica Munzel, Michigan Law
School’s Director of Admissions, testified that it is within
the university’s discretion to decide when a critical mass

31

Poston, supra note 29, at 259. The fear is that, ultimately, “UT
Austin will only be able to enroll automatically admitted students who
qualify by way of the Plan.” Id.
32
Id.; see DALE, supra note 7, at 12.
33
DALE, supra note 7, at 12.
34
See HOUSE RES. ORG., SHOULD TEXAS CHANGE THE TOP 10 PERCENT
LAW? TEX. H.R. FOCUS REP. NO. 79–7, Reg. Sess., at 7 (2005),
http://www.hro.house.state.tx.us/focus/topten79-7.pdf.
35
Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups and the
Constitutionality of Race-Conscious Admissions, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
463, 501 (2012) [hereinafter Diversity Within Racial Groups] (finding
the phrase “critical mass” became the accepted terminology regarding
the body of minority students the university wished to see represented
in its incoming freshman classes). See generally Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
36
See supra text accompanying note 23.
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has been reached.37 The Court accepted the term, but it
made clear during its first hearing of Fisher in 2012 that the
Grutter decision did not “hold that good faith would
forgive an impermissible consideration of race.” 38 In a
decision supported by seven justices, the Supreme Court
remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit, asking for a “more
stringent” review of whether UT Austin should be allowed
to consider race within its admissions criteria.39 Essentially,
the Court held that the Fifth Circuit failed to employ strict
scrutiny in its review of UT Austin’s program.
With its second go at Fisher, the Fifth Circuit, in a
2–1 decision, upheld UT Austin’s race-conscious
admissions program.40 The court held the program to be
narrowly tailored because the consideration of race was
necessary to target certain minority groups, affirming the
idea that “no workable race-neutral alternatives” could
achieve the same goal.41 After the Fifth Circuit denied her
37

See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 318. Specifically, Munzel stated that “there
is no number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages that
constitute[s] critical mass.” Id.
38
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
39
Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling:
Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL
L. REV. 761, 764–65 (2015) [hereinafter Narrowly Tailored but
Broadly Compelling]. In essence, the Court wanted factual proof from
UT Austin to support its contention that, in order to achieve diversity,
its race-conscious admissions program was necessary, along with the
race-neutral approach of the Top Ten Percent law. Id.
40
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633, 659–60 (5th Cir. 2014).
41
Fisher, 758 F.3d at 644, 657 (citing Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420).
Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling, supra note 39, at 791
(quoting Fisher, 758 F.3d at 657). The Fifth Circuit mentions that in
2008 – the year that Fisher sought admission – eighty-one percent of
UT Austin’s incoming freshman class was admitted via the Top Ten
Percent law. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 657. Out of the remaining nineteen
percent of seats left available via the race-conscious, holistic approach,
twelve percent of those admitted were white; 3.3 percent were Hispanic
or African American. Id. To the court, the holistic approach
“overwhelmingly and disproportionately” represented white students,

15
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request for a hearing en banc, Fisher again appealed to the
Supreme Court, which heard the case for the second time
on December 9, 2015.42
IV. Analysis of the Policies
As the Fifth Circuit pointed out during its second
review of Fisher, the Top Ten Percent law functions based
off a “fundamental weakness” in the Texas high school
system.43 Under this law, UT Austin draws a large number
of its applicants from Dallas, Houston, and San Antonio –
three areas that hold over half of the Texas population and,
unfortunately, see some of the most pronounced cases of
segregation within their school systems. 44 Nevertheless,
with its look at Fisher, the Supreme Court must decide
whether the Top Ten Percent law produces adequate
diversity at UT Austin, or whether the addition of UT
Austin’s race-conscious holistic review is necessary in
order to produce such diversity.
In 2004, the year before UT Austin implemented its
race-conscious admissions program, minority enrollment of
African Americans and Hispanics was at a combined 21.4

thus it agreed with the university’s argument that a consideration of
race was necessary in order to “target minorities with unique talents
and higher test scores to add to the diversity” of the incoming class. Id.
42
Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling, supra note 39, at 766.
See generally Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Race in College
Admissions,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/30/us/supreme-court-will-reconsideraffirmative-action-case.html?_r=0.
43
Fisher, 758 F.3d at 650–51 (noting that the “sad truth,” as the court
puts it, is that there is a “de facto segregation” of schools within the
state of Texas which allows the Top Ten Percent law to achieve
diversity).
44
Id. at 651
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percent, both having increased from 2003. 45 Caucasian
enrollment decreased from 59.3 percent to 58.6 percent.46
That same year, “77% of the enrolled African American
students and 78% of the Hispanic students had been
admitted under the Top Ten Percent Law, compared to 62%
of Caucasian students.” 47 Looking at the statistics
generally, these numbers indicate that the UT Austin
achieved its goal of a diverse student body without the help
of a race-conscious admissions program. I say generally
because it is difficult to look at the numbers any other way
when UT Austin, much to the disapproval of the Supreme
Court’s conservative justices, has not defined critical
mass.48
Though UT Austin is not required to place a
numerical value on critical mass, it should be required to
define its goal more precisely.49 Under a strict scrutiny
analysis, the Court must verify that UT Austin can only
achieve the benefits of diversity by using race in its
admissions process. 50 This will be difficult because, as
Judge Garza mentioned in his dissent in the Fifth Circuit’s
second Fisher decision, the Court “cannot undertake a
rigorous ends-to-means narrow tailoring analysis when the
University will not define the ends.”51
45

Jonathan W. Rash, Affirmative Action on Life Support: Fisher v.
University of Texas at Austin and the End of Not-So-Strict Scrutiny, 8
DUKE J. CONST. LAW & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 25, 28 (2012).
46
Press Release, University of Texas at Austin, Fall enrollment figures
show greater percentage of minorities at The University of Texas at
Austin (Sept. 14, 2004) (on file with UT Austin’s website)
http://news.utexas.edu/2004/09/14/nr_enrollment.
47
Fisher v. Univ. or Tex., 631 F.3d 213, 224 (5th Cir. 2011).
48
See Diversity Within Racial Groups, supra note 35, at 472 n.23.
49
Id. at 475–76; see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 758 F.3d 633, 667 (5th
Cir. 2014).
50
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (citing Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 305 (1978)).
51
Fisher, 758 F.3d at 667.
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V. How the Court Will Rule
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Alito,
Thomas, and Kennedy have “never voted to uphold the
affirmative action programs at issue in any racial
affirmative action case that the Supreme Court has resolved
on the merits of a constitutional challenge.”52 Yet out of
those five justices, Kennedy may be the most important.53
Many legal analysts believe that Justice Kennedy will be
the swing vote in the Court’s upcoming decision, a position
he seems to have assumed since Justice O’Connor’s
retirement in 2006.54 This consideration is crucial because
UT Austin’s race-conscious admissions program is based
heavily off of the Michigan Law School program that was
upheld in Grutter, a case in which Justice Kennedy
dissented. 55 What’s more, his views on race-conscious

52

Girardeau A. Spann, Fisher v. Grutter, 65 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC
45, 48 (2012).
53
Four of the nine justices who sat for Grutter and Gratz remain on the
Supreme Court – Scalia, Thomas, Breyer, Ginsberg, and Kennedy. This
article was written before the death of Justice Scalia, which admittedly,
could affect the result in a subsequent affirmative action case. Out of
the other four, three were in the Grutter majority – O’Connor, Stevens,
and Souter. Rehnquist dissented. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. 306.
Roberts, Alito, and Sotomayor were the three justices who heard the
second Fisher case but were not present during Grutter and Gratz
(keeping in mind that Kagan recused herself from the case). See
Diversity Within Racial Groups, supra note 35, at 9.
54
Eboni S. Nelson, Reading Between the Blurred Lines of Fisher v.
University of Texas, 48 VAL. U.L. REV. 519, 523 (2014).
55
Id. at 529; see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003). In his
dissent, Kennedy stated that “the concept of critical mass is a delusion
used by the Law School to mask its attempt to make race an automatic
factor in most instances and to achieve numerical goals
indistinguishable from quotas.” See generally Spann, supra note 52, at
55.
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admissions programs, since the Grutter decision, have
remained relatively the same.56
While on the surface his leanings match him to the
Court’s conservative bloc, Justice Kennedy is different
from Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas when it comes to
race-conscious admissions programs. 57 In his Grutter
dissent, Kennedy reaffirmed what Justice Powell opined in
Bakke, by holding that “[t]here is no constitutional
objection to the goal of considering race as one modest
factor among many others to achieve diversity.” 58 But
where he differs – and quite significantly so – from the
Court’s liberal bloc, is on its application of strict scrutiny.59
Referring to its application of strict scrutiny in Grutter as
“perfunctory,” Kennedy believed the majority abandoned
the standard, giving too much deference to Michigan Law
School’s guarantee that its race-conscious admissions
program was constitutional. 60 Deference, according to
Kennedy, is “antithetical” to strict scrutiny. 61 To him,
details matter, and the details in Grutter mirror those in
Fisher—they are practically nonexistent, according to
Kennedy’s previous stated preferences.62

56

Will the Supreme Court End Affirmative Action? A preview of Fisher
v. University of Texas at Austin on the Eve of Oral Argument, CATO
EVENTS PODCASTS (Dec. 7, 2015) (downloaded using iTunes).
57
See id.
58
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392–93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
59
Paul Horwitz, Fisher, Academic Freedom, and Distrust, 59 LOY. L.
REV. 489, 492 (2013).
60
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61
Id. at 394.
62
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 357 (Thomas, J. and Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justices Thomas and Scalia refer to Michigan
Law School’s goal of achieving diversity as a “we know it when we see
it” approach. Id. He insists that, because the university offers relatively
little in understanding what a critical mass is, the approach is “not
capable of judicial application.” Id. Kennedy endorses this opinion in
his dissent. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 388–89 (Kennedy, J., dissenting);
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With Justice Kagan’s recusal from the case – due to
her previous position as Solicitor General – Kennedy will
more than likely have the deciding vote.63 If he abandons
his historically unflinching stance and casts his vote with
the liberal bloc, the result would be a 4–4 tie, in which the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling would be controlling. However, the
Court will likely treat UT Austin’s program as parallel to
that of Michigan Law School’s program, holding the
university to its contention that “[its] admissions program is
precisely the type of system expressly upheld in Grutter.”64
Undoubtedly cognizant of the similarities between Fisher
and Grutter, Kennedy will likely observe his past position
and vote to strike down UT Austin’s program as
unconstitutional under the standard of strict scrutiny.65
see also Will the Supreme Court End Affirmative Action?, supra note
56.
63
Diversity Within Racial Groups, supra note 35, at 463 n.3.
64
Brooks H. Spears, Casenote, “If the Plaintiffs are Right, Grutter is
Wrong”: Why Fisher v. University of Texas Presents an Opportunity
for the Supreme Court to Overturn a Flawed Decision, 46 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1113, 1137 (2012) (citing Brief in Opposition to Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 16, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 645 F.
Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. May 5, 2008)).
65
Rash, supra note 45, at 26. See generally Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389,
394–95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Fisher, 758 F.3d at 646. In his
Grutter dissent, Kennedy notes that eighty to eighty-five percent of
applicants to Michigan Law School were admitted based on
undergraduate grades and Law School Admissions Test scores alone.
Id. at 389. Similarly, in Fisher, over 80 percent of UT Austin applicants
were admitted via the Top Ten Percent law. Kennedy’s concern is how
universities like Michigan and UT Austin fill the remaining seats by
considering race, among other factors. Fisher, 758 F.3d at 646. To
Kennedy, considering an applicant’s race at this point in the admissions
process can disadvantage those applicants devoid of any minority
status. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 389 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Kennedy
asserts that “the numerical concept of critical mass has the real
potential to compromise individual review.” Id. Further, in Kennedy’s
dissent in Grutter, he stated his belief to be that Michigan could have
effectively used other race-neutral programs to accomplish the same
goal of attaining a diverse student body. Id. Judge Garza, the sole
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VI. What It Means for Other Race-Conscious
Admissions Programs Nationwide
A decision to strike down UT Austin’s program
would allow the Court to “rewrite the deferential standard
espoused in prior cases.”66 In Grutter, Justice O’Connor
disputed the long-held notion that strict scrutiny is to be
“strict in theory, but fatal in fact” and asserted that “context
matters” when applying strict scrutiny. 67 However, this
notion is exactly what Justice Kennedy opposed when
making his remark that deference is antithetical to strict
scrutiny.68 If UT Austin’s program is invalidated, Kennedy
and the Court’s conservative bloc will have a chance to
revise the strict scrutiny analysis to be more fatal in fact.
With a strict scrutiny analysis that is more fatal in
fact, the Court – especially Kennedy – would likely endorse
an instruction that “deference . . . cannot coexist with strict
scrutiny.”69 As it stands now, Grutter allows an overlydeferential standard in which courts defer to universities in
their usage of their race-conscious admissions programs,
but after Fisher, universities may be required to
demonstrate that it “actually needs more diversity in order
dissenter in the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in the second Fisher case, believes
the same can be said of UT Austin—it did not show that “qualitative
diversity is absent among the minority students admitted under the
race-neutral Top Ten Percent Law.” Fisher, 758 F.3d at 669 (Garza,
dissenting).
66
See Rash, supra note 45, at 43; see also Eric K. Yamamoto, Carly
Minner, & Karen Winter, Contextual Strict Scrutiny, 49 HOW. L.J. 241,
248 (2006). Grutter, among others, was a pivotal case that highlighted
a shift in how the Court applied its strict scrutiny analysis.
67
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326–27 (citing Adarand Constructors v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995)).
68
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69
Rash, supra note 45, at 43 (noting, however, that universities, for
First Amendment reasons, “must be afforded some level of deference”
in achieving diversity).
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to attain the educational benefits that flow therefrom . . .
even before reaching the question of whether the particular
policy at issue is narrowly tailored.”70
While the Court may strike down UT Austin’s
program, diversity will remain a compelling state interest
appropriate for universities to pursue. Several states may
elect to ban the consideration of race, however, in order to
avoid a strict review from federal courts.71 Those states that
do will consider different factors separate from yet similar
to race that could effectively yield the same desired result.72
So far, in states that have abandoned race-conscious
admissions programs, public universities have “increased
their emphasis on factors such as overcoming adversity,
geographic variety, and socioeconomic disadvantage.”73 In
doing so, the future of the ultimate public policy objective
established over twelve years ago in Grutter will be
advanced through a mechanism that does not consider race
as one of many factors.

70

Id. at 44.
Adam Liptak, Court Backs Michigan on Affirmative Action, N.Y.
TIMES,
April
22,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/23/us/supreme-court-michiganaffirmative-action-ban.html?_r=1.
72
Kaitlin Mulhere, How Wednesday’s Supreme Court Case Could
Change College Affirmative Action, TIME: MONEY, Dec. 8, 2015,
http://time.com/money/4140410/preview-fisher-texas-supreme-courtaffirmative-action/.
73
Id.
71
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ARTICLE
TIME IS MONEY—BUT OUR INDIGENTS HAVE
NEITHER
By: Lee T. Nutini
I. Introduction
The status of indigent defense in this country now
rests on the issue of insufficient time and money—both for
the client and her counsel. An accused’s lack of time and
money may be material to their predicament, but it is her
counsel’s lack of these necessities that can prove far more
fatal to the accused’s case. From the criminal client’s
perspective, the lawyer’s role is to charge a set fee, accept
the client’s money, zealously represent the client’s interests,
and (hopefully) return freedom: freedom from jail; freedom
from liability; freedom from monies owed—which is why
so many affluent accused will pay whatever it costs to
receive a quality legal defense.1 The issue regarding lack of
resources was most profoundly characterized in Strickland
v. Washington, a landmark Supreme Court case defining the
right to counsel in an increasingly financially polarized
American landscape:
It is an unfortunate but undeniable fact that a
person of means, by selecting a lawyer and
paying him enough to ensure he prepares
1

Indeed, O.J. Simpson famously spent north of $3 Million for his
defense. See V. Dion Haynes, The $25 Million Question: What is
Simpson
Worth?,
CHICAGO
TRIBUNE,
Feb.
7,
1997,http://articles.chicagotribune
.com/1997-02-07/news/9702070269_1_nicole-brown-simpson-losangeles-civil-lawyer-legal-fees.
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thoroughly, usually can obtain better
representation than that available to an
indigent defendant, who must rely on
appointed counsel, who, in turn, has limited
time and resources to devote to a given case.
Is a “reasonably competent attorney” a
reasonably competent adequately paid
retained lawyer or a reasonably competent
appointed attorney?2
When Justice Marshall first proposed this question in 1984,
he wrote with remarkable foresight. Indeed, the state of
indigent defense would come to revolve around the
question of funding. This paper will attempt to answer
Justice Marshall’s question. I will also evaluate the legal
system’s wide array of responses through the Justice
Department’s most recent participation in Hurrell-Harring
v. New York, and propose new solutions that could effect
positive change.
II. The Problem
The overall quality of indigent legal defense is
affected both by private appointed attorneys and public
defenders. Thus, the problem brought to light by Justice
Marshall’s question is best defined by the difference in the
justice provided by attorneys with manageable caseloads,
who are adequately paid for their work, and those attorneys
who are overloaded for their given salary (or those private
defense attorneys who work on an appointment basis). In
essence, the schism is rooted in simple human self-interest:
how does one remain zealously passionate when rewards
seem small, or may not materialize at all? For those
2

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
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hanging a shingle, passion alone cannot pay the electric bill
and keep the lights on. Moreover, the right to counsel
depends upon effective assistance being, at the very least,
possible on the part of the attorney. But lack of funding
nationwide has caused numerous public defense programs
to provide the accused with lawyers “in name only.”3
Lack of both time and money on the part of indigent
defenders translates to insufficient and inadequate
representation in myriad ways. Attorneys who lack
sufficient time to investigate, interview, and simply
communicate with clients cannot fulfill the most essential
requirements of representation. Taken alone, insufficient
funding for public defenders—or poor reimbursement for
appointed attorneys—also affects many critical stages of a
client’s case. For example, public defender offices need
significant cash flow to investigate their clients’ cases,
interview witnesses, hire experts (e.g. hematologists,
fingerprint experts, ballistics experts), or even set up
psychological evaluations required for establishing insanity
defenses or combating mens rea allegations.
This growing funding problem was evident well
before Strickland was handed down. In fact, following the
landmark case Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963,4 New York
founded its Office of Indigent Legal Services in 1965.5
Like many other states,6 control over the public defense
3

Brief for Respondents at 9, Hurrell-Harring v. New York, No. 03–
3674 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (citing the need for “standards and
procedures to ensure that attorneys appointed to represent indigent
criminal defendants have sufficient qualifications and training”).
4
See generally Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5
Counsel at First Appearance, NYS Office of Indigent Legal Services,
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/
counsel-first-appearance (last visited April 29, 2016).
6
See County-Based and Local Public Defender Offices, 2007, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT:
CENSUS OF PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES 2007, (2010) [hereinafter DOJ
REPORT], http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/clpdo07.pdf (noting that
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system was ceded to New York’s counties, rather than
giving responsibility to the state government itself.7 This
setup was intended to provide more efficient appointment
services to local indigents. But the counties were illequipped to handle the growing number of indigents facing
complex legal issues who could not afford a local attorney.
Here in Tennessee, the first public defender office was set
up in Nashville in 1962,8 and another in Knoxville soon
after the constitutional mandate was passed down in
Gideon. 9 But the problem facing public defenders in
Tennessee, New York, and across the country is that they
are so overloaded with cases that their everyday
functioning borders on ineffective assistance of counsel.
Furthermore, when private appointed attorneys
become over-appointed, their acceptance of a new case is
tantamount to professional ethics violations. 10 The ABA
Model Rules make it clear that attorneys must provide
clients with a baseline amount of communication as well as
providing them with information necessary to the variety of
client-controlled decisions. 11 Attorneys who accept too
many appointments often commit per se ethical violations,
twenty-seven states operate county-based systems, with the twenty-two
remaining states using state-wide oversight).
7
Counsel at First Appearance, NYS Office of Indigent Legal Services,
https://www.ils.ny.gov/content/
counsel-first-appearance (last visited April 29, 2016).
8
See A Short History of the Public Defender, NASHVILLE DEFENDERS,
http://publicdefender.nashville.
gov/about-us/a-short-history-of-the-public-defender/ (last visited March
29, 2016).
9
Becoming the CLO, CLO, https://www.pdknox.org/who-weare/becoming-the-clo/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
10
At the very least, their duties of competence, caseload management,
and zealous representation are affected by receiving too many
appointments. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, 1.3 cmt.
[2], Preamble cmt. [2] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
11
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013);
see also id. at r. 1.2 cmt. [1].
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with some admitting they often do not know or recognize
their clients’ names; indeed, some appointed attorneys fail
to speak to clients before their first day in court.12
The situation is equally disastrous for public
defender offices. To illustrate the reality of the problem,
consider the following data recently reported for public
defenders and legal aid organizations in New York: in one
populous New York county, attorneys regularly carried
caseloads of five hundred to six hundred cases.13 If one
attempts to break down this caseload into hours worked on
each client’s behalf, it amounts to an average of four hours
per case, with only one hour of investigation and
interviewing.14 As many practicing attorneys will admit, a
proper initial client interview will last at least an hour, and
drafting motions and pleadings (not to mention
correspondence with counsel and client) can take months of
work. Worse still, ethical guidelines are intended as a floor,
not a ceiling, on proper conduct;15 attorneys who cannot
meet the floor are violating their professional duties on a
daily basis. Thus, New York public defenders do not spend
nearly enough time with their clients to properly or
ethically represent the client’s interests.
In Tennessee, the problem is far worse. Public
defenders in cities here have reported handling over 10,000
misdemeanors per attorney every year, spending only an
12

See David Knowles, Worst Lawyer Ever? Texas Attorney Slept
through Client’s Trial, Forgot His Name, and Failed to Enter a Plea
Bargain, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, at 1 (Sept. 17, 2013, 9:41 PM),
http://www.nydaily
news.com/news/national/worst-lawyer-defense-attorney-sleeps-trialarticle-1.1459210.
13
James C. McKinley, Jr., In New York, Cuomo Pledges More Aid for
Lawyers of the Indigent, N.Y. TIMES, at 2 (Oct. 21, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/1FzjyzZ.
14
Id. at 3.
15
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N
2013).
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hour on each client.16 My own experience in Tennessee is
that, even in a simple civil matter, client interviews often
last at least an hour; engagement correspondence and
document drafting take longer. Put simply, no reasonable
client, if given the option, would permit her attorney to
spend so few hours on her case. But these clients do not
have an option, largely because they cannot shop around in
the market; they cannot request an attorney who is not
overworked.
Indeed, national standards exist to define best
practices for public defenders to properly manage
caseloads. The American Bar Association recommends
defenders handling only one hundred and fifty felony cases
or four hundred misdemeanor cases per attorney, per year.17
But nearly seventy-five percent of county-based public
defender offices exceeded the maximum number of
recommended cases per attorney, per year. 18 These
attorneys’ time is not the only issue; they must bear
excessive caseloads while suffering from low pay. The
2007 Department of Justice census statistics report that the
median salary for these entry-level assistant public
defenders is around $43,000 nationwide.19 Even after six
years of experience, salaries peaked between $54,000 and
$68,000.20 Thus, it is no surprise that Justice Marshall’s
dissent in Strickland remains true thirty years later.21
16

See Laurence A. Benner, When Excessive Public Defender
Workloads Violate the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Without a
Showing
of
Prejudice,
ACS
[hereinafter
BENNER],
https://www.acslaw.org/files/BennerIB_ExcessivePD_Workloads.pdf
(citing DOJ REPORT, supra note 6, at 1).
17
DOJ REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
18
Id. at 1.
19
Id. at 13.
20
Id. at 13.
21
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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III. New Efforts for Reform
A. The Case of Hurrell-Harring: New York’s
Indigents Fight Back
The problem has most recently come to the fore in
Hurrell-Harring v. New York, a class action suit in New
York challenging the indigent defense status quo. 22 The
Hurrell-Harring case was brought as a challenge to New
York’s county-based system, hoping to force the state to
address concerns that its public defenders were so
overworked and underpaid that their clients ultimately
“receive no legal defense at all.” 23 The case hopes to
resolve an issue that mirrors Justice Marshall’s original
question in Strickland: that inadequate resources result in
constructive ineffective assistance of counsel.24 In the same
opinion, Justice Marshall explained the practical effect of
the issue he was attempting to frame, stating that the right
to effective assistance of counsel
“is violated not whenever there is a flaw or
“deficiency” in the quality of the legal
representation provided indigent criminal
defendants, but when that representation,
taken as a whole, is so inadequate as to
“undermine[ ] the proper functioning of the
adversarial process [so] that the trial cannot
be relied on as having produced a just
result.”25
22

Hurrell-Harring v. New York, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div.
2009).
23
Matt Apuzzo, Holder Backs Suit in New York Faulting Legal Service
for Poor, N.Y. TIMES, at 1 (Sept. 25, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1uqCzRD.
24
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 3, at 17.
25
Hurrell-Harring, 883 N.Y.S.2d at 351–52 (citing Strickland, 466
U.S. at 686) (emphasis added).
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The Hurrell-Harring case, in essence, argues that this
description befits the current state of indigent defense in
New York.26 Because of its deep systemic criticism, the
case has the flavor of a national movement, drawing
support from leading legal power players as it began to
receive national attention. Indeed, the suit, which was filed
by the New York Civil Liberties Union, has drawn support
from the Department of Justice and then-Attorney General
Eric Holder,27 and projects to be a model for challenging
similar understaffed and poorly run indigent defense
organizations.
The case, which was originally filed in 2007, came
on the heels of a 2006 report by a New York commission
appointed by the state’s Chief Judge Judith Kaye that found
that the “chronically understaffed” public defender offices
amounted to severe constitutional violations. 28 The
plaintiffs in Hurrell-Harring argued for New York to take
back control over the county-run public defense system,
invigorating it with sufficient resources to guarantee
adequate representation. When the case was filed, indigent
plaintiffs described a system in which they were left to
“navigate courts nearly alone, relying on spotty advice
from lawyers who do not have the time or money to
investigate their cases or advise them properly.”29
As the case has progressed, significant players in
today’s legal sector have weighed in on Hurrell-Harring
and come to the indigents’ aid. For example, after blame
fell at the feet of New York Governor Andrew M. Cuomo
for the state’s ineptitude, even then-Attorney General Eric
Holder joined in the fight. 30 Mr. Holder made public
26

See id.
See Apuzzo, supra note 23, at 1–2.
28
See McKinley, supra note 13, at 3.
29
See Apuzzo, supra note 23, at 1.
30
See id. In the past, Mr. Holder has pushed for reducing harsh
sentences, and eliminating mandatory minimum sentences for
27
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statements similar to his support of public-defense reform
in Washington State in 2013, demanding that New York
address the massive caseloads burdening its public
defenders.31 In his public statement, Mr. Holder implored
New York to “truly guarantee adequate representation for
low-income defendants [by] ensur[ing] that public
defenders’ caseloads allow them to do an effective job.”32
Specifically, Mr. Holder urged the Justice
Department to file an interest statement (similar to an
amicus brief) in support of the plaintiffs in the HurrellHarring case. 33 The Justice Department’s motion urged
New York to address the grievous inequities in its indigent
defense system, citing limited funds and excessive
caseloads that reduced the counties’ attorneys to
representation “in name only.”34 The Justice Department
also urged New York State Supreme Court Justice Gerald
W. Connolly, who heads review of the case, to evaluate the
entire system of indigent defense, not just the plaintiffs’
individual cases.35 Luckily, nationwide publicity and calls
for aid from these high-level officials yielded a settlement
with Governor Cuomo and New York.
B. The Hurrell-Harring Settlement as Model
The settlement, reached on October 21, 2014,
committed New York State to provide “bigger and better”
public defense offices, infusing them with millions of

nonviolent drug crimes, both of which help return a sense of justice
back to America’s criminal justice system. Id. at 2.
31
See id. at 2.
32
See id.
33
See id.
34
See McKinley, supra note 13, at 2.
35
See Apuzzo, supra note 23, at 3; see also Brief for Respondents,
supra note 3.
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dollars over the next several years.36 It mandates changes in
Long Island and four other upstate counties, with the state
agreeing to pay for more defense attorneys, investigators,
and experts to assist in the defense of indigent clients. Most
importantly, the state agreed to establish new caseload
standards for its overworked attorneys: it will define an
appropriate level, and then pay whatever expenses arise in
meeting that level (which will likely require adding jobs to
reduce the workload of its present attorneys).37 Overall, the
settlement creates lock-step improvements that will
combine with infusions of cash to aid indigents for at least
the next seven years.38
While Governor Cuomo stated that the settlement
addresses problems his office “inherited” from past
administrations, he took a great step forward by making
numerous large-scale, specific promises to address the
problem in his state.39 These specific strategies have been
hailed as potentially serving as a “model” for other New
York counties to address their own broken criminal defense
systems.40 If applied elsewhere, states would need to take
responsibility for funding public defender offices and
establish (and meet) caseload minimums for attorneys.
Because of the shift in funding from county to state, it
seems likely that state legislators would need to brace their
constituents for new or rising taxes and, perhaps, prepare
for an appropriations battle. In that sense, New York has

36

See McKinley, supra note 13, at 3 (stating that the settlement terms
will last approximately seven years).
37
See Stipulation and Order of Settlement, infra note 44, at 7.
38
See McKinley, supra note 13, at 3.
39
See Statement, N.Y. GOV, Andrew M. Cuomo, Statement from
Governor Andrew M. Cuomo on Settlement Regarding Indigent Legal
Services, (Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/
statement-governor-andrew-m-cuomo-settlement-regarding-indigentlegal-services(last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
40
See McKinley, supra note 13, at 1.
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been bold to take on the indigent defense funding
responsibilities under the Hurrell-Harring settlement.
However bold, the settlement model does not seem
to add anything new to the spectrum of available options
already in use across the country. In fact, recent statistics
show that twenty-two states already utilize a statewide
public defender oversight system.41 As noted previously,
the Hurrell-Harring settlement also promises to set
caseload standards, with New York agreeing to pay the cost
of reducing attorney workloads to the appropriate level.42
But the ABA and various federal judicial commissions
already have long-established “best practice” caseload
guidelines in place.43 While it is clear that New York – and
other states for that matter – have not abided by these past
guidelines, agreeing to abide by “new” standards seems
much more like puffery than actual progress. Anyone with
even a slight pessimistic lean can review the HurrellHarring settlement agreement and find nothing novel about
it. In essence, it is a relatively simple settlement that merely
forces the New York state government to set standards and
pay for the necessary changes. But the settlement
agreement is hardly expansive; it merely covers the costs of
bringing five of New York’s sixty-two counties to a
constitutional level of adequate representation.44 Thus, the
settlement’s ability to serve as a model for other states is
limited by New York’s own willingness to serve only a
fraction of its people. The state’s promises under the
settlement terms are closer to a mere gesture; in order to
finally cover the costs of providing justice to all of the
state’s indigents, New York must do much more. Thus, the
41

See DOJ REPORT, supra note 6, at 1.
Id.
43
BENNER, supra note 16, at 1, 5.
44
See generally Stipulation and Order of Settlement at 1, HurrellHarring v. New York, 883 N.Y.S.2d 349 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (No.
8866–07) (noting that only five counties are party to the agreement).
42
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settlement might best serve as a model for other New York
counties, but its limited terms fail to be sufficiently
groundbreaking to gain the attention of other state
administrations.
C. Can County-Run Systems Work? Tennessee as
Model.
The theory behind the Hurrell-Harring settlement is
that county-run programs are no longer sufficient to
provide adequate legal representation to indigents. Well
before the settlement announcement, Jonathan E. Gradess,
the executive director of the New York State Defenders
Association, stated that he no longer believed a countybased defense system could be effective. 45 Indeed, Mr.
Gradess now dismisses them as “primitive.”46 Is it proper to
turn away from those systems? Indeed, there are currently
twenty-seven states operating under a predominantly
county-based system. 47 Official statistics show that, on
average, three-quarters of these county-run systems operate
with caseloads that exceed recommended maximums.48 But
if attorney attrition is any indication of an office’s health,
these offices reportedly have attorney attrition rates of less
than one percent.49 Perhaps these low attrition rates connote
job satisfaction, which itself may imply that representation
is adequate.50
While a state-by-state analysis of constituent
county-run systems is far beyond the narrow scope of this
45

See Apuzzo, supra note 23, at 4.
See id.
47
See DOJ REPORT supra note 6, at 1 (defining county-based systems
as those “principally funded” by the county or through combination of
county and state funds).
48
See id. (using data from 2007).
49
See id. (using data from 2007).
50
Of course, low attorney attrition rates may show nothing more than a
depressed legal market.
46
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paper, let us consider, for example, Tennessee’s unique
county-based system. Since its full establishment in the late
1980s, the state’s public defender system has operated on a
district-by-district basis. 51 But prior to 1987, private
counsel took indigent appointments, except in Shelby
(whose public defender office was founded in 1917) and
Davidson (whose office was founded in 1961) Counties.52
Today, Tennessee is one of only two states 53 that has
elected public defenders in each of its thirty-one judicial
districts. 54
Tennessee’s county-based system is unique because
the state has set up several helpful institutions to assist its
indigent defenders. For example, the District Public
Defenders Conference (Conference) provides oversight by
monitoring and providing funds for these separate public
defender offices. 55 The Conference’s primary role is to
make policy decisions on a statewide basis. The state has
also aided its public defender offices by setting up the
Office of the Post-Conviction Defender (OPCD) and PostConviction Defender Commission in 1995. 56 These
institutions assist the public defenders by assisting with
investigations related to capital convictions, even providing
training for capital defense attorneys. 57 Because a nine51

TENN. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS TENNESSEE’S INDIGENT
DEFENSE FUND: A REPORT TO THE 107TH TENNESSEE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY
8–9
(2011)
[hereinafter
AOC
REPORT],
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/
sites/default/files/docs/aoc_indigent_defense_fund_report.pdf.
52
Id. at 8.
53
The other state is Florida. See STEPHEN D. OWENS ET AL., U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES,
FY 2008-2012-UPDATED 25 (2015) [hereinafter CENSUS REPORT],
http:// www.bjs. gov/content/pub/pdf/idsus0812.pdf.
54
See AOC REPORT, supra note 51, at 8.
55
CENSUS REPORT, supra note 53, at 25; see Tenn. Code Ann. § 8–14–
202 (2016).
56
Id.
57
CENSUS REPORT, supra note 53, at 25.
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member, governor-appointed Oversight Commission
regulates the budgetary processes for indigent defense in
Tennessee, some of the state’s most populous counties
receive additional funding from state resources.58 On the
whole, only thirteen states spend more than Tennessee on
indigent defense services.59 Thus, Tennessee operates what
appears to be a hybrid county-based system with statewide
policy regulation and assisted funding. But does it work for
Tennessee’s public defenders, and most importantly, for the
state’s indigent defendants?
D. Evaluating Tennessee’s Hybrid Model
The Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts
(AOC) issued a detailed report in 2011 to inform the
Tennessee General Assembly of the current status of the
state’s indigent defense program.60 Speaking to the efficacy
of the state’s program, the AOC Report stated that despite
inadequate staffing, the statewide public defender system
was “very cost-efficient.”61 The AOC Report also stated
that Tennessee’s appointment of private attorneys in cases
of public defender conflicts (or in moments of high
caseloads) is a “reasonable way to complete” its
constitutional obligation to the state’s indigents.62 Notably,
the Report shied away from recommending a “shadow”63
public defender system – essentially an alternate, second
office that steps in when conflicts arise – because of the

58

Id. Shelby and Davidson counties receive both local and state
funding. Id.
59
See id. at 31–32.
60
AOC REPORT, supra note 51, at 2–4.
61
Id. at 16.
62
Id. at 16.
63
These offices are also sometimes referred to as Alternate Public
Defenders or Offices of Conflict Counsel, depending on the locality.
See id.
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high cost.64 It also refused to recommend a contract-based
system due to national concerns over private attorneys
being disincentivized from providing timely and adequate
representation.65 Indeed, the AOC reported that Tennessee’s
current district-focused system is “likely the best system of
its kind” for its current purposes.66
Laudably, the AOC attempted to provide its own list
of modifications in its report that might improve on this
“best system.”67 The AOC recommended two modifications
to improve Tennessee’s indigent defense system: (1)
shifting potential savings from correcting the private-public
attorney imbalance68 to increase the Rule 13 hourly rate for
appointed attorneys; and (2) decriminalizing some minor
offenses in order to reduce the total number of
incarcerations.69 First, the AOC used numbers prepared by
the American Bar Association to provide a per capita
analysis for indigent defense costs.70 They reported that
Tennessee does not overspend on indigent defense; its per
capita cost ranked in the middle of states. 71 Though
Tennessee’s per capita costs have risen from $9.01 in 2006
to $11.81 in 2009, the AOC found that the state has
continued its middle-of-the-road trend. 72 Ultimately, the
AOC recommended that any additional funding should be
channeled into providing better hourly rates for private
64

Id.
Id.
66
Id.
67
See id. at 26.
68
The AOC reports that, in many areas, too many private attorneys are
appointed—perhaps out of convenience—for cases that are better
suited for the local public defender office. Id. at 26. The Report
suggests that savings will arise from returning each type of counsel to
its proper role, and any such savings should be allocated to increasing
the hourly rate for properly appointed private attorneys. Id.
69
Id. at 19, 23–24.
70
Id. at 16–19.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 18.
65
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attorneys working appointed cases; its polled participants
unanimously agreed that the hourly rates for Rule 13 work
were too low. 73 Secondly, the AOC Report noted that
numerous polled participants indicated their desire to see
the number of jailable offenses reduced.74 Likewise, some
data indicated a drive toward decriminalizing some minor
offenses.75 Though the AOC noted that this modification
would not be “popular” with legislators, it recommended a
committee address the issue to determine which offenses
might be best suited for fines, and not jail time.76
I feel that the AOC Report’s analysis does well to
recommend decriminalizing minor offenses, but misses the
mark on its complacent approach to per capita spending.
The Report fails to properly account for the burdens placed
on understaffed defender offices and economically
depressed private appointment-seeking attorneys. Indeed,
the AOC Report fails to communicate any regard for
potential collateral benefits of increased hiring: adding jobs
may help spur an economy by putting money into the hands
of the under- or unemployed.77 It dismisses the concept of
alternate or “shadow” public defender offices merely
because the setup costs would be “prohibitive”78—thus, the
AOC easily overlooks an investment in its indigent defense
system that could yield economic dividends well into the
future. For example, setting up a shadow office would
73

Id. at 19. The AOC, writing aspirationally, stated that any savings
gleaned from re-balancing the public-private indigent defense numbers
should be applied to increasing the Rule 13 hourly rates. Currently,
appointed attorneys receive hourly rates of $40 for out-of-court work
and only $50 for in-court work. Id.; see also TENN. S. CT. R. 13
(2)(c)(1) (“The hourly rate for appointed counsel in non-capital cases
shall not exceed forty dollars ($40) per hour . . . .”).
74
AOC REPORT, supra note 51, at 23.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 23–24.
77
See generally AOC Report, supra note 51.
78
Id. at 16.
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mean adding a handful of attorneys who would add to the
tax base and provide for more manageable caseloads,
resulting in better indigent representation.
Of course, setting up an alternate public defender
office would require adding several jobs in each county, but
imputed conflicts rules necessitate these separate offices.79
The benefit of adding numerous offices is that more local
economies could be affected by job growth and the
resulting increase in consumer spending. In reality,
Tennessee’s larger counties should be able to find room in
their budgets for these new offices: indeed, cities ranging in
size from Los Angeles to Albany have effectively funded
these alternate public defender offices for decades. 80
Therefore, the AOC’s myopic evaluation is consistent with
conservative disregard for beneficial economic growth via
additional hiring. Lobbying for the funds to add jobs –
attorneys, investigators, and paralegals alike – in the public
defender offices seems the quickest way to alleviate
caseload concerns. Meanwhile, setting up a dual system
with a shadow public defender office avoids the added
costs of private appointments that arise when the public
defender is conflicted out.81
Furthermore, although I agree that raising the Rule
13 hourly rate might drive more attorneys into the market
for appointments, the feedback I have received “on the
79

Id. at 11.
Compare
LOS
ANGELES
COUNTRY,
http://apd.lacounty.gov/FAQs.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (showing
data from Los Angeles, California), with ALBANY COUNTY,
http://access.
albanycounty.com/countybudget/2014/executive/_pdf/2014palternatepublicdefender.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2016) (showing data
from Albany, New York).
81
The AOC reported that allowing public defenders, rather than private
appointed attorneys, to handle more cases can and should result in
savings to the state’s indigent defense fund. See supra note 68 and
accompanying text.
80
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ground” indicates that other, more nuanced symptoms
currently plague the indigent defense economy. In speaking
with young attorneys in the Knoxville area, who seek court
appointments, many felt distraught at the level of
competition for the very same jobs that the AOC thinks
require more incentives to prove worthwhile. 82 By
anecdote, I have heard numerous attorneys beaten out at the
courthouse by eager, but perhaps underachieving, young
lawyers who seek to pile up appointments at a low cost. Of
course, all attorneys need to pay their bills and keep the
lights on. But all too often reports surface revealing that
appointments have been used as a vehicle for over-billing
in a wholesale approach to earning a decent lawyer’s
salary.83 The AOC Report hopes only to increase the Rule
13 hourly rates,84 but due to these current symptoms, that
would merely provide a windfall to the attorneys already
hoarding or battling for appointments. Admittedly, this
unfortunate symptom is difficult for the AOC to recognize
through data, as it is made up entirely of attorney
competition and financial pressures within certain local
bars. But one simple way to counteract negative effects of
raising the Rule 13 rate is for courts to tighten their
tracking of appointment numbers. 85 Some courts ignore
situations when an appointment-saturated attorney requests
even more appointments; indeed, well-publicized data 86
82

See AOC REPORT, supra note 51, at 19 (increasing the rates “will
encourage greater participation by lawyers who are currently unwilling
to take appointments”).
83
See infra note 89 and accompanying article (discussing Harris Co.,
Texas attorneys taking excessive appointment caseloads to make
millions).
84
AOC REPORT, supra note 51, at 26.
85
Of course, a full explication of proposals to counteract this problem
would provide enough material to fill several additional essays. Thus,
here I will only provide a small bite of the apple.
86
A common example of courts condoning excessive appointment
numbers is the situation in Harris County, Texas. See Robb Fickman,
We Must Change Harris County’s Shameful Appointment System Now,
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exists to show the level of over-appointment that courts
condone.87 If courts refuse to consistently compile data on
an appointment-per-attorney basis, then a rising Rule 13
rate would inevitably result in appointment hoarding and
exacerbate inadequate indigent representation.
Consequently, the AOC appears to have
misunderstood the present issue: indigents are not suffering
from a lack of attorneys taking appointments; rather, they
suffer from poor performance from those attorneys
hoarding appointments (one need only Google the name
“Jerome Godinich” to plainly see the abuse present in our
nation’s appointment system).88 Without better appointment
tracking, higher Rule 13 rates would only serve to channel
more money into the hands of those already accepting
appointments, not drive better lawyers into the field in an
attempt to re-take those responsibilities.
IV. Proposing New Solutions
The AOC Report provides quality data analysis and
decent recommendations for the future of indigent defense
http://blog.fickmanlaw.com/2013/01/we-must-change-harris-countysshameful-appointment-system-now/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2016); see also
TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION, infra note 88 (displaying table
of appointment numbers).
87
Fickman, supra note 86, at 1. For the data table, see TEXAS INDIGENT
DEFENSE COMMISSION, Harris County Appointment Caseloads 2011,
GOOGLE DOCS, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0By1E7S
WXMpKnRUVydEw3Um1zUW8/edit (last visited Apr. 7, 2016).
88
Consider, for example, that Mr. Godinich, a Houston, Texas attorney,
has been appointed cases to the tune of $250,000 per year, all while
gaining national attention for his missed habeas corpus deadlines,
among other infractions. See KHOU.COM, Experts: Harris Co. Taking
Risks
with
Lawyer
Appointment
System,
http://www.khou.com/story/news/local/2014/07/11/11209168/
(last
visited Nov. 8, 2014); see also TEXAS INDIGENT DEFENSE COMMISSION,
supra note 87, at 1 and accompanying data table (showing Mr.
Godinich’s over-appointment ratio in his Houston, Texas practice).
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in Tennessee. But its proffered modifications do not appear
to be solutions to the present symptoms. Indeed, new
solutions should be proposed that square with the nuanced
economic and client-felt symptoms reported today. The
client-centered symptoms can best be categorized as either
(1) inadequate attorney-client contact, including failures of
communication, and (2) insufficient public funding that
creates de facto inadequate and ineffective legal
representation. Proposed solutions to each of these
symptoms will be addressed in turn.
A. Solving Inadequate Attorney-Client Relations
Indigent defense statistics nationwide reflect
attorney-client communication that fails to even meet the
floor set by professional legal ethics standards.89 Attorneys
who fail to meet with clients for mere minutes prior to
pleas, or those who cannot recognize the faces or names of
their clients on the day of court, amount to little more than
legal representation “in name only.”90 In essence, these sad
realities are the inevitable conclusion of an indigent defense
system in which both public defenders and private
appointed
attorneys
are
overworked
and
undercompensated. Thus, when facing prevailing attorneyclient relationships the answer to Justice Marshall’s query
in Strickland is clear: effective representation arises from
counsel who are not overworked and adequately paid.91
First, a side issue looms large when attempting to
define new procedures to meet Sixth Amendment
constitutional standards. Indeed, one must fire at the proper
target. The target here is defined by the fact that adequately
paid retained representation and today’s appointed
89

See KHOU.COM, supra note 88, at 2.
See Knowles, supra note 12, at 2–3.
91
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
90

43

Spring 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 44
attorneys produce two completely distinct forms of justice.
Indeed, no one seems to argue that indigents are denied
effective counsel because they did not receive Johnnie
Cochran-style zealousness.92 The difference in those two
legal economies has produced best practice status quos that
provide high justice only for those willing and able to fork
over the cash. But should the two modes of representation
be forced to comply with the same just result? In other
words, should the public take it upon itself to provide
indigents with results at least as good as results received by
private hired counsel? The answer to that question would
prove fruitful for an entirely new essay on the matter.
However, for the limited purpose of this article, it seems
that a floor of justice might be the line to consider when
addressing economic strategies to improve indigent
defense. That is, sufficient funds are not generally available
to provide all indigents with top-of-the-line counsel, and
present cues indicate that baseline efforts to provide
reasonably competent counsel are widely tolerated. Sadly,
indigent justice is a lower justice—and strategies to
improve that standard must address the proper opposition
and attempt to reach the correct goal. Thus, solutions
proposed to remedy indigent defense must be directed at
the actual style of representation that indigents deserve
under the state and federal constitutions.
Given the above status quo, we must propose
solutions to the “lower” form of justice that marks
inadequate attorney-client relationships and communication
with indigent clients. In my view, the acceptable floor of
communication must be that detailed by the ABA Model
Rules regarding professional ethics and responsibility. The
Model Rules’ proscriptions are easy enough to follow,93 but

92

See Haynes, supra note, 1.
The Model Rules require reasonably timed call-backs and keeping
clients reasonably informed as to the status of their litigation, among
93

44

Spring 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 45
given the reports supra, many current public defenders and
private appointed counsel fail to meet the low standard. The
real systemic issue today is that lawyers fail to report—and
thus courts fail to enforce—these simple practice guidelines
when potential misconduct arises. 94 While the judiciary
cannot force the legislature to add jobs or fund
appointments, it can be sure that the democratic wheels will
begin to churn when reversal upon reversal piles up
following a showing that attorneys did not adequately
communicate with their clients. My instinct is that
numerous judges overlook the fact that attorneys are
providing wholly inadequate representation, often failing to
communicate with clients even once prior to plea, because
they are sympathetic to local defense offices’ lack of
resources. But why should judges – of all people – permit
constitutional inequities due to budget concerns? This lack
of enforcement of known ethics rules is tantamount to
ruling from a political bench. The failure to do their part,
permitting reversals based on ineffective assistance and
lack of communication, means that judges have abdicated
their proper role in our society.

other things. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.4 (AM. BAR
ASS’N 2013).
94
For example, note the massive amount of “covered up” instances of
prosecutorial misconduct by the Department of Justice itself. See
PROJECT ON GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT, Hundreds of Justice Attorneys
Violated Professional Rules, Laws, or Ethical Standards (Mar. 13,
2014),
http://www.pogo.org/our-work/reports/2014/hundreds-ofjustice-attorneys-violated-standards.html. See generally DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, Annual Report 2012, at 7–
13, http://www. justice.gov/opr/annualreport2012.pdf (summarizing
complaints and investigations of attorney conduct).
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B. Solving Insufficient Public Funding for Public
Defenders and Appointment Processes
Secondly, the focus of Justice Marshall’s Strickland
query lies within the constraints placed on legal
representation by both time and money.95 But, as we are
often reminded, time is money—and that ipse dixit proves
true for indigent defense economies. All at once, appointed
attorneys lack the funding necessary to commit their time
to their appointments, while public defenders have too
many cases (which acts as a drain on their time) and not
enough money to pay for additional investigators,
paralegals, interpreters, experts, and anything else
necessary for a proper defense. It is clearly not a novel
concept that increased public funding should solve
problems of both time and money, but apparently the best
arguments in favor of increased funding have not yet been
heard by the powers that be. Indeed, it seems the only
manner in which justice can be restored to indigent defense
programs is to increase funding to add attorney positions,
raise hourly appointment rates, and provide for the
ancillary services necessary for proper legal representation.
Critically, we face a new age of legal economies.
The larger American economy faces a unique paradox of
having a concurrent glut of jobless but trained JDs and
chronically understaffed public defense programs.96 Indeed,
all JDs graduate with problem-solving skills97 and the legal
analytics necessary to address myriad concerns of the
average citizen, including criminal matters.98 Perhaps law
95

See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
For a brief but knowledgeable perspective on this paradox, see
William E. Foster, There Are Not Too Many Lawyers, HUFFINGTON
POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/william-e-foster/not-too-manylawyers_b_2631224.html (last updated Apr. 8, 2013).
97
See id.
98
This is precisely why the Model Rules on permissive withdrawal do
not allow attorneys to refuse an appointment based on ignorance or
96
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schools could create cooperative programs with the local
bar to commit several new graduates to the local public
defender offices for one- or two-year terms, or even pledge
them to a program for a term of appointment work to help
reimburse tuition debt. Law schools could use program
funding from their “access to justice” initiatives to assist
these cooperative programs in paying new graduates’
salaries. In exchange for their commitment to indigent
defense programs, these young lawyers would receive basic
courtroom experience, reduce law school debt, and develop
a greater sense of the public service essential to a life in the
law. Just as programs like Teach for America have proven, I
believe young and skilled graduates will happily trade an
uncertain future for the lower-pay, high-reward positions in
underserved areas. 99 Indigent defense co-ops would be
rebranded as a valuable way to gain experience while
serving the public, and, if they follow the Teach for
America model, these positions may even become highly
competitive and prestigious.100 A prestigious rebrand would
ultimately draw the attention of the law schools’ best
students. These concepts are just the tip of the iceberg, but
any effort to merge a market of attorneys who need work
with those indigents who need representation is a fine way
to alleviate the inadequate representation caused by
excessive caseloads.
Furthermore, it is no secret that every state and local
government faces financial challenges that hardly permit
inexperience alone. All JDs are equipped with basic skills to address
common criminal matters, especially with a bit of extra study or help
from an associated attorney. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.
1.1, r. 1.1 cmt. [2], r. 6.2 cmt. [2] (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
99
Valerie Strauss, How Teach for America became Powerful, WASH.
POST, Oct. 22, 2012, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/answer-sheet/wp/2012/10/22/how-teach-foramerica-became-powerful-2/
100
See id.; see also 2015 Annual Report, TEACH FOR AMERICA,
https://www.teachforamerica.org/about-us/annual-report.
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finding room in the budget for new hiring.101 Moreover, in
some areas it may be politically unpopular to seek
additional funding to aid representation for the indigent
accused.102 However, budgetary challenges have not been
addressed from the correct perspective. It seems to me that
in any government, regardless of its tax base, funds should
be doled out first to those issues facing constitutional level
discrepancies. That is, budgets cannot be balanced while
also excluding the proper funds to merely meet the
constitutional floor on indigent representation. Of course,
Gideon v. Wainwright and its progeny demand that the
indigent be provided with effective counsel. 103 Judges’
frequent use of the blinder method 104 is appalling,
commonly overlooking indigents who fail to receive any of
the essential duties of representation set by the ABA Model
Rules: competence, communication, and zealousness. 105
Funding programs that meet this floor for every indigent – a
101

For a comprehensive report on post-recession state and local budget
woes, see generally 60 MINUTES, “State Budgets: The Day of
Reckoning,” (CBS television broadcast Dec. 19, 2010),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/state-budgets-the-day-of-reckoning/.
102
See, e.g., Brenda Goodman, Official Quits in Georgia Public
Defender Budget Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2007, at A18,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/us/07georgia.html?_r=0.
103
Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 355, 344 (1963).
104
Judges sometimes choose to ignore clear ethics violations in the
indigent defense context, a tactic I refer to as “putting on blinders.” See
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC., Assembly
Line Justice: Mississippi’s Indigent Defense Crisis, at 10,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/ms_
assemblylinejustice.authcheckdam.pdf (“LDF’s investigations found
that in circuit courthouses throughout the state, [ethics rules] are often
ignored by defense attorneys, prosecutors, and judges who are sworn to
uphold them”).
105
Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1, r. 1.4,
Preamble (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
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low standard for bare-minimum justice, indeed – must take
precedence over more common legal requests, such as
increasing judicial salaries. I fail to see how common
funding requests like road improvements have for a
generation been taken more seriously than efforts to fund
adequate indigent legal representation. Only one of these
expenses sounds in our state and federal constitutions, not
to mention extensive post-Gideon Supreme Court
jurisprudence.
V. Defending and Improving the Solution
A. Can a Lawsuit be a Solution?
Lawsuits like Hurrell-Harring are effective insofar
as they bring media attention to a worthy cause, but
litigation fails to address problems stemming from the
judiciary. Litigation that forces states to address inequities
– as Hurrell-Harring does – will obviously change the way
lawyers deal with indigent clients. In fact, as discussed
supra, the Hurrell-Harring settlement model forces New
York to set new standards for caseloads, and then to pay for
any ancillary costs of meeting those lower caseloads:
adding new attorneys, offices, staff, etc.106 Those remedies
will undoubtedly affect the quality of legal representation
experienced by New York’s indigent clients. Indeed,
indigents will be represented by attorneys who have more
time and resources to represent their interests.
But what this sort of litigation-based reform does
not do – and thus does not model for other states facing
similar issues – is affect the way judges appoint attorneys
or rule on (or even perceive) ineffective assistance claims.
Specifically, a settlement like Hurrell-Harring will permit
attorneys to spend more time and money on needy clients,
but the settlement will not ensure that clients are actually
106

See Stipulation and Order of Settlement, supra note 44, at 7.
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receiving better services. The settlement does not include
terms tied to particular outcomes, but merely regulates the
front-end infusion of resources.107 In reality, judges may
not be able to tell when clients receive the settlement’s
intended benefits or if an attorney has actually committed
her extra time to the client’s cause. Thus, states like New
York may not see fewer ineffective assistance claims
following the Hurrell-Harring settlement, despite having
more money to remedy poor indigent defense.
B. How Can We Ensure Litigation-based Reform
Improves Indigent Defense?
States like Tennessee that may face litigation as
local indigents attempt to improve the quality of defense
should be careful to tie settlement terms to specific and
measurable outcomes. Litigation can certainly bring
attention to a needy cause, but states should only promise
resources that affect results. A complete settlement should
also include terms that stop providing resources to
programs that do not see improved outcomes over time.
Indeed, if infusions of cash do not reduce ineffective
assistance claims or, at the very least, reduce reports of
indigent dissatisfaction, then the state’s funds are better
spent elsewhere.
But outcomes-based funding tied only to objective
data can wreak its own sort of havoc—see the litany of No
Child Left Behind critics108—so I would suggest measuring
progress through a combination of subjective and objective
107

Id. at 13. Note that the settlement includes some reporting measures,
but fails to specify any terms that connect funding with measurable
improvements, much less the criteria upon which to evaluate efforts. Id.
108
See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Worsened Education, HUFFINGTON
POST, (Aug. 21, 2012, 5:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/08/21/no-child-left-behind-wors_n_1819877.html;
Democrats
Decry “No Child Left Behind,” CNN.COM, (Feb. 21, 2004 11:59 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/02/21/dems.radio.reut/.
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reports. Litigation that results in a settlement similar to
Hurrell-Harring could be extremely effective if funds are
linked to improved experiences by the indigents the
litigation hopes to serve. Subjective improvements could be
measured by administering exit polls or similar evaluations
of the clients’ experience. Judges could also be polled on
the quality of representation they experience in the
courtroom and, perhaps, make a good faith attempt to
report more indigent defense attorneys who consistently
fall below the “effective” standard. For example, if judges
in a locality know that a particular public defender receives
added resources to improve representation, then they can be
“on notice” to remain aware of the quality of service.
Compiling this subjective data and combining it with
objective outcomes (such as data on ineffective assistance
claims) will take manpower, but it could go a long way to
ensuring state resources are being well-spent. Settlement
terms such as those in Hurrell-Harring are just votes of
good faith, if not tied to measurable outcomes that improve
indigent representation on the ground.
VI. Conclusion
Just as Justice Marshall’s powerful dissent in
Strickland foreshadowed,109 indigent defense now centers
on disputes over limited resources. Both counsel’s and the
indigent accused’s lack of time and money to defend their
case has greatly impacted the quality of justice the indigent
experience. Moreover, insufficient resources have forced
public defenders and private appointed attorneys into a new
status quo marked by inadequate representation that is
tantamount to legal ethics violations. Brave settlements,
such as that in Hurrell-Harring, can go a long way to
bringing media attention to the arguably lower form of
109

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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justice indigents commonly receive.110 But litigation and
their associated settlements will only be as effective as their
terms permit; indeed, if infusions of resources are not
conditioned on measurable improvements, then attorneys
may experience a windfall without passing along benefits
to their indigent clients. Indigents in states like Tennessee
who may hope to improve their situation should insist on
both subjective and objective analyses to ensure they
receive the intended benefits of a richer indigent defense
system. Justice Marshall’s words111 have never been truer:
reasonably competent attorneys must have sufficient time
and money to fight for the justice that indigents
undoubtedly deserve.

110

See supra pp. 16–19 and accompanying Part A (discussion on
disparate resources causing two distinct forms of justice, where
indigents receive a “lower form” than wealthier clients).
111
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 708 (1984) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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ARTICLE
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF STOCK IN A CORPORATION
By: Harrison Sullivan1
I. Introduction
Most state constitutions contain a provision that
forbids a town, city, or municipality from owning stock in a
corporation; however, a few state constitutions contain a
provision forbidding that state itself from owning stock in a
corporation.2 This article will examine the following: (1)
why state and federal government ownership of
corporations creates problems; (2) the history and modernday relevancy of the problems on the state level; (3) state
constitutional reactions to the problems; (4) the history and
modern-day relevancy of the problems on the federal level;
(5) whether a federal constitutional amendment is due; and
(6) whether a state constitutional amendment is due.

1

Doctor of Jurisprudence, The University of Tennessee College of
Law, May 2014; B.B.A. Mississippi State University, 2011.
2
See DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. VIII, § 8; TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. II,
§ 29. The constitutions of both Delaware and Tennessee forbid towns,
cities, and municipalities from owning stock in a corporation, but not
the state itself. See, e.g., Eye Clinic, P.C. v. Jackson-Madison Cty. Gen.
Hosp., 986 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that “[t]he
language of Section 29 [of article II of the Tennessee Constitution]
suggests that the drafters intended that the phrase, ‘county, city or
town,’ be confined to its literal meaning”). But see PA. CONST. art.
VIII, § 8 (1968); PA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1968). The commonwealth of
Pennsylvania itself – as well as its towns, cities, and municipalities –
are forbidden from owning equity in a corporation. Per my research,
roughly one fifth of the states have a provision disallowing the state
from owning stock in a corporation.
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II. Problems Arising When Government Owns Stock in
a Corporation
Whenever the government owns stock in a
corporation, problems may ensue. 3 In this article, these
problems generally will be discussed under the aegis of
“shareholder-regulator problems” and will be fleshed out
throughout the article. This section will generally discuss
the nature of the shareholder-regulator problems, then the
difficulty of monitoring such problems, and lastly, the
difficulty of reviewing such problems, in order to give a
background as to why these shareholder-regulator problems
exist in the first place.
A. First: Shareholder-Regulator Problems
By owning stock in a corporation, the government
assumes the roles of both a shareholder and a regulator of
the corporation. Both of these roles, when intertwined in
one governmental unit, create shareholder-regulator
problems. To understand the extent of these problems, first
consider the nature of both of the roles individually.
i. Government as a Shareholder
Generally, a shareholder is an individual or entity
that owns stock in a corporation. Shareholders traditionally
are granted certain rights – via state corporation law – such
as the right to elect and remove the board of directors,
amend the corporation’s corporate charter, vote to approve
corporate strategy decisions such as mergers and
acquisitions, and bring shareholder derivative suits. 4
3

See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, When the Government is the
Controlling Shareholder, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1293, 1317 (2011).
4
See 1 Publicly Traded Corporations: Governance & Reg. § 2:7 (2013)
(surveying various states’ corporate statutes).
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However, the shareholders’ most important role is to elect a
board of directors to run the corporation, determine its
policies, and appoint officers to effectively manage the
corporation. 5 When the government owns stock in a
corporation, the government assumes these roles and
responsibilities and is required to act for the betterment of
the corporation’s shareholders in all respects. If the
shareholder is a controlling shareholder, the shareholder
assumes even more responsibilities, and thus, the
shareholder-regulator
problems
are
even
more
6
pronounced. First, the controlling shareholder owes
fiduciary duties to the remaining shareholders. 7 Second,
heightened legal standards for alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties apply to the controlling shareholders.8
ii. Government as a Regulator
The government is also a regulator of corporations.9
As “[r]egulation is a significant and distinct feature of how
modern [governments] govern their economy and society

5

See id. (“The board in turn designates officers to act as agents of the
board. Within this model, however, the board is presumed to act as a
surrogate for and in the interests of the shareholders.”)
6
Under Delaware law, for example, a shareholder is deemed to be a
“controlling” shareholder if (1) “the shareholder controls a majority of
the votes in a corporation” or (2) “if the shareholder controls less than a
majority but there is evidence that the shareholder exercises control
over the board [of directors].” See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at
1315 (citing Rodman Ward, Jr. et al., Folk on the Delaware General
Corporation Law § 151.5.1 (5th ed. 2006)).
7
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1315.
8
See id.
9
See Andrew S. Taylor, How and Why to Regulate the American
Corporation,
DISSIDENT
VOICE
(Sept.
11,
2010),
http://dissidentvoice.org/2010/09/how-and-why-to-regulate-theamerican-corporation/ (“Corporations are formed by government action
at the state (rather than federal) level.”).
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through rulemaking and enforcement,”10 “most American
laws regarding corporate formation and operation are
written at the state level.”11 This means that each individual
state is a regulator of the corporations incorporated within
its state and is responsible for ensuring that each
corporation complies with the state’s own regulatory
efforts. 12 The federal government, on the other hand,
“govern[s] [its] economy and society through rulemaking
and enforcement” 13 of acts such as Sarbanes-Oxley or
through creating agencies like the Securities and Exchange
Commission to oversee self-regulating organizations such
as the New York Stock Exchange.14
Over time, the role of corporate regulator has
changed. More recently, states have allotted corporations
expanded freedom as an incentive to incorporate in their
states, ostensibly to attract more business and thereby
increase tax revenues.15 As a result, “each state [has] vied
10

Myriam Senn, Developing Regulatory Governance in Times of
Transnational Regulation: From a Heuristic to an Analytic Approach?,
INST.
OF
PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE
&
MGMT,
http://www.esade.edu/public/modules.php?name=news&idnew=964&n
ewlang=English.
11
Taylor, supra note 9.
12
See id. For an example, states have regulated corporations by
regulating their securities at the state level through “blue sky” laws. See
Steve A. Radom, Balkanization of Securities Regulation: The Case for
Federal Preemption, 39 TEX. J. BUS. L. 295, 298 (2003).
13
Senn, supra note 10.
14
See Cary Coglianese, ET AL., The Role of Government in Corporate
Governance, REGULATORY POLICY PROGRAM AT THE CENTER FOR
BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, at 2–3,
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/var/ezp_site/storage/fckeditor/file/pdfs/cen
ters-programs/centers/mrcbg/programs/rpp/reports/RPPREPORT8.pdf.
15
See id. For example, in Delaware, the state corporation law gives
corporations “enormous freedom” of contract to adopt terms and
provisions that incorporators believe to be most advantageous to their
particular enterprise. Edward P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom
and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 845, 847 (2008); see also Jones Apparel Group v. Maxwell
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to establish the most permissive corporate environment,
wooing potential business managers with increasingly
liberal legal environments for corporate formation and
operation.”16 The federal government, on the other hand,
has increased its regulatory role, creating regulatory
reforms in the wake of the recent corporate scandals to
ensure accountability.17
B. Difficulty of Monitoring the ShareholderRegulator Problems
In addition, it is very difficult to monitor such
problems when they occur among shareholders. 18 For
regular, private shareholders, most issues arise from
financial incentives, such as when one shareholder enriches
himself financially at the expense of another shareholder.19
However, a government has a wide variety of incentives
other than strictly financial ones. 20 Indeed, for some
scholars, the predominant concern when the government
owns stock in a corporation is that the government will
attempt to “induce the corporation to pursue political or
policy goals rather than maximize the corporation’s value
for the proportionate benefit of all its shareholders.”21 It

Shoe Co. 883 A.2d 837, 845 (Del. Ch. 2004) (stating that
“Delaware's corporate statute is widely regarded as the most flexible in
the nation because it leaves the parties to the corporate contract
(managers and stockholders) with great leeway to structure their
relations . . . .”).
16
Taylor, supra note 9 (stating that “corporations have experienced a
steady increase in business freedom over the past century . . . .”).
17
See Coglianese, ET AL., supra note 14, at 2–3, 5.
18
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1317–18.
19
See id. at 1318.
20
See id.
21
Id. For an opinionated view on the government’s interest as
shareholder, see Brian Hunt, A Timeless Lesson on Investing with the
Government, THE GROWTH STOCK WIRE (Feb. 11, 2013),
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usually is easy to measure and identify such improperly
motivated financial transactions amongst shareholders;
however, determining whether a particular transaction
amongst shareholders only serves to effectuate the
government’s political goals, and not the shareholders’ or
the corporation’s objectives, is much more difficult to
identify or measure because political goals can be
amorphous and far-reaching.22
C. Review of Shareholder-Regulator Problems
Whenever a government owns stock in a
corporation, it is extremely difficult to review decisions
made by the government as a shareholder for administrative
law purposes. Most private shareholders are unitary actors,
and even when such a private shareholder is a corporation,
there is a hierarchical authority structure within the
corporation so that the Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) or
the board will be held accountable.23 However, within a
particular government, the executive branch and the
legislative branch each may exert control over interests in a
corporation, and thus, many problems could arise both
within and across the two branches. For example, consider
this problem within a state: if the state treasury owns stock
in a corporation, should the entire Executive Branch be
held accountable? Should the regulatory agency of the state
(and not the Treasury who might own the stock) be entirely
responsible for regulating, or should the Treasury be held
responsible too? The answer to those questions could create
an entirely new system of checks and balances within a
http://www.growthstockwire.com/3307/a-timeless-lesson-on-investingwith-the-government.
22
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1318 (“Self-dealing transactions
and material-conflict transactions are relatively easy to identify by
objective standards. By contrast, to determine whether a transaction
serves the government’s political goals is much harder.”).
23
See id. at 1318–19.
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government. And what if different political interests control
the executive and legislative branches, as is likely in the
case of divided party government? In that situation,
different political actors may bring different influences to
bear on the matter of regulation.
III. State Shareholder-Regulator Problems
As mentioned, both state and federal governments
may own stock in a corporation. However, as the two have
inherently different responsibilities, roles, powers, etc., so
too are their shareholder-regulator problems vastly
different. Consider the shareholder-regulator problems of
the state.
A. Historical Ownership
The tension between the state’s self-serving interest
as shareholder and its role as a government regulator has
been prevalent from the beginning of this country’s history;
however, this matter was more common earlier on, as many
states played a more robust regulatory role before they
started relaxing regulatory laws to attract business.24 In the
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, for example,
states’ financial interests in one corporation often prevented
the state from chartering25 a competitor corporation for fear
of the state losing dividends due to the increased
competition.26
24

See Mariana Pargendler, State Ownership and Corporate
Governance, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2917, 2927, 2932 (2012).
25
At that time – showing its role as a regulator – only a state legislature
could charter a corporation and to do so required an individual
legislative act. See id. at 2927–28.
26
See id. One such example took place in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania in 1792 when Pennsylvania attempted to acquire shares in
the lucrative Bank of North America. Although the negotiations
ultimately did not lead to an agreement, local merchants were upset that
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i. Pennsylvania
Perhaps the most notable example of this occurred
in 1803 when a group of local merchants petitioned the
legislature to charter the Bank of Philadelphia, which
would have been a direct competitor of the
commonwealth’s recently chartered investment, the Bank
of Pennsylvania. 27 The commonwealth opposed the
chartering of yet another banking institution in the state
because it would reduce the Bank of Pennsylvania’s profits
and therefore endanger the commonwealth’s investment.28
Local merchants responded by arguing that with “the
extensive interest which the [commonwealth] holds in the
Bank of Pennsylvania, [the commonwealth] cannot too
seriously consider the probable baneful effects of an
additional chartered Bank at this period, on fiscal concerns
of the state and on the banking system.”29 Interestingly,
Pennsylvania came face-to-face with the tension resulting
from its dual role as both a shareholder and a regulator:
As a stockholder in the Bank of
Pennsylvania, its interests presumably
coincided with those of the private investors
the commonwealth government went outside of the commonwealth for
an investment, and therefore attempted to obtain a corporate charter for
a competitor of Bank of North America in Pennsylvania: the Bank of
Pennsylvania. Hesitant to potentially thwart their pending investment in
Bank of North America by chartering its competitor, the Pennsylvania
government agreed to allow the charter for Bank of Pennsylvania only
if the commonwealth was allowed to subscribe to a third of the bank’s
capital stock as consideration for potentially harming its investment in
Bank of North America. See id. at 2928–29.
27
See id. at 2928.
28
See id.
29
Id. (quoting Anna Jacobson Schwartz, The Beginning of Competitive
Banking in Philadelphia, 1782–1809, 55 J. POL. ECON. 417, 429
(1947)).
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of the bank, but as arbiter of the public
welfare, it had to consider the views of the
promoters of the Philadelphia Bank. These
[views] conflicted with the ambitions of
Bank of Pennsylvania stockholders.30
The commonwealth’s new holding in the Bank of
Philadelphia had the potential to create another
shareholder-regulator problem in the future, and in 1807, its
interests as a shareholder in the bank led it to oppose
another bank’s incorporation request. 31 The Bank of
Pennsylvania offered to pay the commonwealth a large sum
of money in return for denying the Bank of Philadelphia’s
charter; instead, the government decided to accept “bonus”
payments from the Bank of Philadelphia for allowing the
bank to incorporate in the commonwealth. 32 These
payments were subsequently made “until the liquidation of
the [commonwealth’s] shareholdings in banks in 1837
created the preconditions for a truly liberal chartering
policy.”33

30

Id. at 2929 (quoting Schwartz, supra note 29, at 426–27). Notably,
one legislature’s proposal – advocating for the elimination of this
tension – aptly described the conflict of interests the dual roles
inevitably brought about:
[I]t being the duty of the government to consult the
general will and provide for the good of all,
embarrassments must frequently be thrown in the
way of the performance of this duty, when the
government is coupled in interest with institutions
whose rights are founded in monopoly, and whose
prosperity depends on the exclusion and suppression
of similar institutions.
Id.
31
See id.
32
Richard
Sylla, Early American Banking:
The Significance of
the Corporate Form, 14 BUS. & ECON. HIST. 105, 111 (1985).
33
Pargendler, supra note 24, at 2929.
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ii. New Jersey
The State of New Jersey experienced a similar
conflict of interest in regard to a different industry. In 1832,
New Jersey passed a monopoly bill that gave exclusive
privileges to a railroad corporation in exchange for a large
amount of the corporation’s stock to the state.34 However, a
few years later, a competitor corporation petitioned the
state for a charter to build and operate a turnpike that likely
would have decreased demand for the railroad.35 The state
refused the charter – and thus, stifled its competition –
because granting it would have hurt the state’s immensely
profitable equity position in the original railroad
corporation.36
B. Modern Ownership
As capital and product markets developed
throughout the nineteenth century, state equity ownership
in corporations became increasingly rare and remained so
well into the twentieth century.37 Especially after World
War II – even while foreign governments were quickly
increasing their equity positions in private corporations38 –
34

See id. at 2930.
See id.
36
See id. at 2930–31 (quoting John Joseph Wallis, Market-Augmenting
Government? States and Corporations in Nineteenth-Century America,
MARKET-AUGMENTING
GOVERNMENT:
THE
INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS FOR PROSPERITY 223, 251 (Omar Azfar & Charles A.
Cadwell eds., 2003) (stating that the state needed to “preserve inviolate,
sacred and unimpaired, the faith, the integrity, and the revenues of the
state . . . .”).
37
See id. at 2931.
38
For example, by 1929, the Brazilian government had taken over twothirds of the country’s railroads’ equity positions. See id. at 2932.
China, Italy, and most of continental Europe have also seen large-scale
increases in the number of state-owned corporations. See generally id.
at 2942–54.
35
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states largely decreased their equity positions with tax
regimes, which replaced dividend payouts as the major
source of government revenue from corporations.39
IV. State Constitutional Redresses
From the late eighteenth century into the early
twentieth century, many states were adopting their own
state constitutions and freely amending provisions within
them. However, respective state governments took differing
positions on whether they could own equity in a
corporation. 40 For example, consider Pennsylvania and
New Jersey.
A. The State Cannot Own Equity in a Corporation:
The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
As noted previously, Pennsylvania was abruptly
faced with shareholder-regulator problems when it bought
stock in a corporation.41 Interestingly, the 1790 version of
the Pennsylvania Constitution – the constitution in place at
the time of the mentioned facts – contained no provision
forbidding state ownership of stock in a corporation, which
would have prevented the shareholder-regulator problems
from arising in the first place.42 Perhaps the conflict of
39

See id. at 2931–32 (quoting Adolph A. Berle, Property, Production
and Revolution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1965)) (stating that the
income tax rates “virtually make[] the state an equal partner [in the
corporate enterprise] as far as profits are concerned”). This incentivizes
state governments to “enact corporate laws that are more managerialist
[sic] than is socially desirable . . . .” Id. at 2932.
40
See generally DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. VIII, § 8; TENN. CONST. of
1870, art. II, § 29.
41
See generally Part II, section A. of this article.
42
See
P A.
CONST.
of
1790,
art.
VIII,
§
8,
http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/textsof-the-constitution/1790.
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interest stemming from state ownership of a bank was not
enough for the state legislature to act. However, the
commonwealth adopted another version of its constitution
in 1838, which was later amended in 1857 to include a
provision forbidding the commonwealth – and its towns,
cities, and municipalities – from owning stock in a
corporation. 43 What happened in between? The
Pennsylvania Railroad Company incorporated.
In 1846, Pennsylvania Railroad Company (“PRR”)
was chartered as a corporation in Pennsylvania.44 As part of
the corporation’s initial capital financing, Allegheny
County and the City of Philadelphia purchased shares of
the corporation’s stock.45 The commonwealth effectively
gave PRR a monopoly in the state, as it also turned down
the opportunity to charter another competitor railroad
whose presence would have limited the future dividends
from PRR.46 This initial funding of the corporation caused
quite a stir amongst Pennsylvania residents and legislators
at the time because many believed it was not the two
municipalities’ roles to invest in private companies.47 As
one state legislature remarked, “[Philadelphia], in
undertaking this immense work of State improvement, will
leave the quiet orbit in which she has hitherto revolved to

43

See PA. CONST. of 1838, art. XI, § 5, 7, (amended 1857),
http://www.duq.edu/academics/gumberg-library/pa-constitution/textsof-the-constitution/1838.
44
See 1 COVERDALE & COLPITTS, THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD
COMPANY: CORPORATE, FINANCIAL AND CONSTRUCTION HISTORY OF
LINES OWNED, OPERATED AND CONTROLLED TO DECEMBER 31, 1945 9
(Allen, Lane & Scott 1947).
45
See id. at 13.
46
See ALBERT J. CHURELLA, THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, VOLUME
I: BUILDING AN EMPIRE, 1846–1917 100–01 (Richard R. John et al.
eds., Univ. of Pa. Press 2011).
47
Id. at 101.
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rush into a wild and eccentric path in which she was never
designed to move.”48
The two municipalities went forward with
purchasing the company’s stock, and by 1856 half of their
equity investments were worthless due to a variety of
misfortunes.49 This resulted in “toxic effects” between the
municipalities that had invested in PRR and PRR itself.50
The worst result of these investments in
railroad stock by Philadelphia and other
communities in the State was not the loss of
many millions of the taxpayers’ money, but
the close association and alliance thereby
created
between
certain
powerful
corporations and the various . . .
governments, an association and alliance
which is generally thought to be . . . one of
the leading causes of the misgovernment
long so manifest throughout the state . . . .51
Even though both the public and private sectors were at
fault, the voters in Pennsylvania could direct their blame
only towards the former, and did so in 1857 with an
amendment to the commonwealth’s constitution that
directly forbade the commonwealth, as well as its
municipalities, from owning stock in a corporation.52 Even
48

Id. (quoting the July 1846 minority report of the Joint Committee of
the Philadelphia City Councils).
49
Philadelphia lost close to $5 million, and Allegheny County lost
millions in pledged county bonds to the company. See generally id. at
100–02.
50
Id. at 102.
51
Id.
52
See ROSALIND L. BRANNING, PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT 32 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Press)(1960). Compare PA.
CONST. of 1838, art. XI, § 5, 7, (as amended 1857), with PA. CONST. of
1838.
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though the direct implications of the PRR fiasco only
involved the municipalities, in considering this amendment,
the 1857 General Assembly undoubtedly considered the
shareholder-regulator problems that the commonwealth had
encountered with the state bank, as well as the need to
prevent the commonwealth from mixing its interests too
extensively with corporations, just as the municipalities had
done in the PRR situation.
B. The State Can Own Equity in A Corporation:
The State of New Jersey
As noted previously, New Jersey also faced a
shareholder-regulator problem in its equity ownership in
infrastructure within the state.53 At the time of the conflict
of interest New Jersey, like Pennsylvania, had no provision
in its constitution forbidding state ownership of equity in a
corporation. 54 Unlike Pennsylvania, however, the New
Jersey legislature never adopted a later constitutional
provision forbidding the state from owning equity in a
corporation.55 In fact, the 1947 version of New Jersey’s
constitution contains a provision disallowing municipalities
from owning equity in a corporation—implicitly allowing
the State of New Jersey to do so.56

53

See generally Part II, section A. of this article.
The State of New Jersey has passed three different constitutions: the
first in 1776, the second in 1844, and the current, in 1947. The first
Constitution (the one in effect at the time of the noted conflict of
interest) contained no provision disallowing the state from owning
equity in a corporation. See generally N.J. CONST. of 1776.
55
See generally id. N.J. CONST. of 1844; N.J. CONST. of 1947.
56
See N.J. CONST. of 1947 art. VIII, § 3. See generally Eye Clinic, P.C.
v. Jackson-Madison Cty. Gen. Hosp., 986 S.W.2d 565, 571 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1998) (stating that “[t]he language of Section 29 suggests that the
drafters intended that the phrase, ‘county, city or town,’ be confined to
its literal meaning”).
54
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V. Federal Ownership and Its Shareholder-Regulator
Problems
As a result of the recent financial crises, the federal
government responded by intervening in private enterprises
as never before: “[g]overnments . . . increased their
regulatory control over businesses in financial services and
other sectors; businesses assist[ed] governments in
implementing regulation; and governments [were] directly
and indirectly engaged in financing businesses that had
been conducted through non-governmental entities.” 57
Basically, the federal government created a massive bailout
of banks, financial institutions, and automobile
manufacturers by purchasing shares of the corporations’
stock, by effectuating mergers and acquisitions, and
overseeing restructuring of corporations.58 This article will
now specifically focus on the federal government’s
purchase of stock in corporations.59 Until recently, there
had been marginal precedents for such extensive
governmental intervention in a private corporation;
however, these precedents laid the foundation for the recent
large-scale government purchase of stock.
57

Joan MacLeod Heminway, Federal Interventions in Private
Enterprises in the United States: Their Genesis In and Effects on
Corporate Finance Instruments and Transactions, 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 1487, 1487 (2010).
58
See Aaron Jack, The Economic Freedom Amendment: A States-Based
Response to the Nationalizing Effects of Bailouts and Federal
Ownership of Corporate Stock, 13 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y
PRAC. GROUPS 32 (2012). See generally Heminway, supra note 57
(describing all the federal government’s interventional efforts).
59
See generally Kahan & Rock supra note 3, at 1299 (summarizing
different voting stock, nonvoting stock, debt, and control positions of
the federal government’s recent investments in corporations).
Additionally, federal ownership in stock of a corporation is not to be
confused by government-sponsored enterprises, corporations that are
privately owned and chartered by Congress to further public policy
goals.
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A. Historical Ownership
During the Great Depression, with the banking
system on the verge of collapse, Congress created the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (“RFC”) to make
loans to struggling banks, and in 1933, Congress created
the Emergency Banking Act, which gave the RFC the
authority to purchase preferred stock in struggling banks as
a way of providing financial capital to them.60 All in all, the
RFC purchased preferred stock in nearly 40 percent of all
banks in the country.61 This injection of capital was praised
at the time, and some suggest that it prevented the collapse
of the banking system and eventually enabled the federal
government to receive most of its initial investment back.62
Fifty years later, the federal government again
bought stock in a corporation, this time the Continental
Illinois National Bank. 63 Congress, through the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), purchased $1
billion worth of preferred stock in Continental – the
seventh largest bank in the country at the time – because it
feared the struggling bank’s failure would result in other
60

See Lisa L. Broome, Government Investment in Banks: Creeping
Nationalization or Prudent, Temporary Aid?, 4 FLA. INT. L. REV. 409,
421–22 (2009).
61
See id. at 421.
62
See id. at 423–24 (stating that the federal government broke even on
its RFC investments); see also id. at 423 (quoting MILTON FRIEDMAN
& ANNA SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
1867–1960 427 (1963)) (stating that Milton Friedman said the RFC
“played a major role in the restoration of the banking system”); id.
(quoting JESSE JONES, FIFTY BILLION DOLLARS 34 (1951) (stating that
the head of the RFC remarked that “[i]f the system as a whole had not
been assisted by the injection of a large amount of new capital into
about one-half of all banks in the country, the collapse would have
become so widespread that few, if any, banks could have continued
operating”).
63
See id. at 424.
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banks failing as well.64 However, as a result, there was a
significant amount of criticism and political fallout,
because the federal government essentially determined that
some institutions were “too big to fail” while others were
not.65
B. Modern Ownership: The 2008 Financial Crisis
The 2008 financial crisis began when the
investment bank Bear Stearns collapsed and the federal
government orchestrated a deal in which J.P. Morgan
would acquire Bear Stearns; however, the federal
government allowed the similarly situated Lehman
Brothers to fail, choosing to rescue Bear Stearns and not
Lehman Brothers because Bear Stearns was “too big to
fail.”66 In the wake of the fall of the Lehman Brothers and
the ensuing financial crisis, Congress passed the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008
(“EESA”), 67 which gave the Treasury unprecedented
authority to directly intervene in the financial markets and
the economy at large through the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (“TARP”). 68 Although the bill was originally
64

See id.
See id. at 424–25.
66
See generally Jack, supra note 58.
67
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110–
343, 122 Stat. 3756 (codified in 12 U.S.C.A. § 5221).
68
See Matthew R. Shahabian, The Government as Shareholder and
Political Risk: Procedural Protections in the Bailout, 86 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 351, 351 (2011). This bill set aside $700 billion to strengthen
Wall Street’s financial institutions. See id. at 352. The EESA also
purposefully blocked judicial review of the government’s actions under
the bill, as the lack of judicial review helped to ensure the Treasury
would not be tied up in court during the financial crisis. See id. Ben
Bernanke rationalized the EESA by stating that it would increase
investor confidence and ultimately have a positive impact on the
economy and GDP. See Chairman Ben S. Bernanke, Before the
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.
65
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intended to give the Treasury authority to buy “toxic”
assets from struggling financial institutions to provide
immediate relief, the Treasury quickly started buying newly
designated and issued series of preferred stock from such
institutions. 69 It thus became the largest shareholder in
corporations like Citigroup, American International Group
(“AIG”) and Bank of America.70 While past ownership of
stock did not create many tangible shareholder-regulator
problems, this more recent trend has created a multitude of
them, as “[t]he [federal] government’s preferred stock
investments in financial services firms gave it a current,
long-term financial and, to some extent, governance stake
in the recovery of these systemically important firms.”71
i. Shareholder-Regulator Problems
Under the terms of the EESA, the federal
government receives preferred voting stock of a
corporation in exchange for its financial investment in the
corporation and therefore possesses the traditional type of
control over a corporation that comes with common stock,
Senate, Federal
Reserve
System,
September
23,
2008,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/
bernanke20080923a1.htm.
69
Perhaps following European trends? See generally Landon Thomas,
Jr. & Julia Werdigier, Britain Takes a Different Route to Rescue Its
Banks,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct.
8,
2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/worldbusiness/09pound.
html?_r=0; Jack, supra note 58 (stating that there is little evidence to
suggest that Congress intended for the TARP funds to be used in this
manner).
70
See Shahabian, supra note 68, at 351–52. The Treasury used the
$700 billion to purchase shares in many troubled financial institutions;
however, the three largest, most troubled institutions – Citigroup, AIG,
and Bank of America – required more financial aid than the rest, and as
a result, the federal government became the majority shareholder in
them. Id. at 352.
71
Heminway, supra note 57, at 1489.
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such as having the ability to elect a board of directors or to
vote on major corporate transactions. 72 Because the
government is also a regulator, however, it can use that
capacity to carry out many of the same roles, and possibly
more, than a voting shareholder would. This dual role
position has led to many fears of possible large-scale
nationalization of private business, as the federal
government, with no termination period on either the EESA
or the TARP, could keep buying controlling equity
positions in private businesses as a means to carry out
policy agendas.
For example, Congress could enact a statute that
effectively modifies any share purchase agreement between
the Treasury and financial institutions receiving money
under the EESA. 73 Because the EESA allows executive
compensation to be subject to approval by the Treasury, the
federal government could potentially exert undue influence
on a corporation’s executives by refusing to approve their
salaries until the corporation fulfills the government’s
wishes.74 The Treasury also retains a unilateral right to veto
an end to the relationship, disallowing the receiving
corporation from terminating the relationship on its own.75
Additionally, although the regulations enacted pursuant to
carrying out its role as a shareholder are subject to judicial
review, the government’s actions as a shareholder are not,
72

See Shahabian, supra note 68, at 358.
See id. at 359.
74
See id. This provision in the EESA was a direct result of AIG
executives giving themselves bonuses (before the EESA was enacted)
with money given to it by the federal government. See Representative
Earl Pomeroy’s response to the bonuses where he proclaimed, “Have
the recipients of these checks no shame at all? . . . [AIG bonus
recipients] are disgraced professional losers. And by the way, give us
our money back.” Kahan & Rock supra note 3, at 1301 (quoting Carl
Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, A.I.G. and Wall St. Confront Upsurge
of Populist Fury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at A1).
75
See Shahabian, supra note 68, at 359.
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which gives the federal government great freedom to act
first and ask permission later. 76 All of these regulatory
powers enable the federal government to possess leverage
that a typical shareholder could not. This presents a
problem for private shareholders, as the government can
use its position [as a shareholder and a regulator] to further
political goals and engage in informal policymaking by
influencing corporate policy . . . .”77 Consider the following
examples of where this has already happened.
A. American International Group, Inc.
In the fall of 2008, while the Bear Stearns and the
Lehman Brothers saga was ongoing, the federal
government rescued AIG from collapse by providing it
with $85 billion in exchange for 79.9 percent of its voting
equity. 78 Afterwards, the federal government wanted to
settle the money that AIG owed other financial
corporations and began negotiating with those
corporations.79 However, two years later, a congressional
subpoena showed that the original settlement terms with
one of the corporations was later modified to waive all
legal claims against it.80 As one New York Times article
notes, the waiver was added after the “federal regulators
force[d] [AIG] to accept it,”81 possibly through one of the
unique leverage tools described above. Beyond that, there
has been much criticism that the federal government

76

See id.
Id. at 360.
78
See Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1309. Note that this agreement
took place a month prior to the enactment of the EESA, thereby not
confining the federal government to receive strictly nonvoting shares.
79
See Shahabian, supra note 68, at 361.
80
See id. at 361–62.
81
Id. at 361.
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“‘unfairly handcuff[ed]’ A.I.G. and ‘undermin[ed] the
financial interests of taxpayers.’”82
B. General Motors
Starting in late 2008, the Treasury also interpreted
TARP to provide itself with the authority to operate outside
of “financial institutions” and to intervene directly in the
failing automobile industry. 83 Accordingly, the federal
government also extended $49.5 billion to General Motors
(GM) in exchange for a 60.8 percent equity stake in the
corporation.84 Such a stake effectively “turn[ed] GM into a
82

Shahabian, supra note 68, at 361–62. However, ultimately, the
federal government profited close to $12.4 billion off of the AIG
investment. See Zachary Tracer, AIG Stock Sale Repays Bailout as U.S.
Government
Profits,
BLOOMBERG
(Sept.
11,
2012),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-11/aig-stock-prices-at-3250-share-astreasury-cuts-stake.html. So, perhaps the federal government’s strongarm tactics paid off?
83
The following is an interpretation of “financial institution:”
For GM and Chrysler to fit [the] definition [of a
“financial institution” under TARP], one must read
the phrase ‘any institution, including, but not limited
to’ to sweep in institutions that are not financial
institutions under any normal understanding of the
term. As a matter of statutory interpretation, that
argument hardly passes the smell test. As a matter of
politics, the Treasury had little choice: Congress had
already rejected a request to authorize funds to bail
out the auto industry and had only passed the EESA
on its second try. But however thin the basis under
the EESA, it did not help the secured bondholders
who objected in the Chrysler bankruptcy; they found
out that they did not have standing to make the
argument.
Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 1311–12.
84
Deepa Seetharaman, U.S. Reports $9.7 Billion Loss on General
Motors
Bailout,
REUTERS
(Oct.
29,
2013)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/29/us-autos-gm-treasury-
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sort of Government Motors, making the federal government
the company’s de facto boss and bank lender.” 85 As a
shareholder and regulator, one major issue that the federal
government faced with owning such a large stake in GM
was whether to focus on making money or on making clean
and “green” cars. 86 As a result, when GM prioritized
environmental concerns, the federal government pushed
back, presumably with the intent of getting its investment
back. 87 The federal government attempted to use its
regulatory role to pass legislation that would have crippled
GM’s attempts at researching and producing the cleaner,
greener cars; however, the Obama Administration stepped
in to minimize congressional management in that area.88
C. Shareholder-regulator Problems Abroad
Other countries have experienced significant
shareholder-regulator problems as well. Although not under
the same United States law, these examples illustrate the
inherent problems associated with the federal government
owning stock in a corporation. Consider Brazil and the oil
company, Petrobas. At the time of the discovery of new
oilfields off its coast, Brazil owned forty percent of the oil
corporation, which meant that the government would have
to share a significant portion of their profits from Petrobas
with outsiders.89 To capitalize on the recent discovery and
idUSBRE99S0WL20131029. The Treasury also invested in Chrysler
for an eight percent equity interest. See Jack, supra note 58.
85
Neil King & Jeffery McCracken, Control of GM Would Create
Conflicts for Government, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2009,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124087977542061821.
86
Id.
87
See Shahabian, supra note 68, at 362–63.
88
See id. Also note that the federal government recently announced an
estimated loss of $9.7 billion on the GM bailout. See Tracer, supra note
82.
89
See Pargendler, supra note 24, at 2941.
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the potential for enormous profits, Brazil agreed to assign
Petrobas rights in the oil reserves in exchange for
additional company equity.90 “The result was a high-profile
self-dealing transaction in which the interests of the
Brazilian public as indirect beneficiaries of the
government’s oil and equity holdings were pitted against
the economic interests of Petrobas’s minority (and mostly
foreign) investors.” 91 This is a classic example of the
shareholder-regulator problem.
VI. Federal-Based Response: Is It Time for an
Amendment to the United States Constitution?
As illustrated, the government’s dual role as both a
shareholder and a regulator presents a significant risk of
creating problems for the corporation, the shareholders, and
the competitors alike.92 Usually, most states and countries
do not effectuate the most important restraints on
government power via regulations or statutes because of the
elevated risk involved; instead they inscribe these restraints
90

See id.
Id.
92
See id. at 2965. For a more expansive list, consider these
consequences of the government owning stock in a private corporation:
it creates an uncertain regulatory environment; disrupts bankruptcy
laws; disrupts lien laws (unsecured versus secured creditors); upends
interest rate structure; distorts risk versus reward principles inherent in
free market system; disregards contract rights; threatens private
property rights fundamental to our capitalist system; creates moral
hazards and fundamental conflicts of interest in governmental officials'
dual roles as regulator and shareholder (public trust versus private
fiduciary duty); suspends judicial review in violation of separation of
powers principle; leaves disenfranchised investors with no legal
recourse due to sovereign immunity; and threatens free market system
at all levels, not just "too big to fail" institutions. KANSAS OFFICE OF
SECURITIES COMMISSIONER, Economic Freedom Amendment: A
States-based
Response
to
Nationalization
and
Bailouts,
http://ksc.ks.gov
/index.aspx?NID=187.
91
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in constitutions, which are (usually) significantly harder to
amend—and thus reduce risk of government limiting
burdens on its own exercise of power.93 As the federal
government currently has significant power to pursue its
own incentives as a shareholder, creating the inherent
shareholder-regulator problems, should the United States
appropriately restrain the federal government’s power in
this arena with an amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
A. Possible Strategies
Although an amendment to the United States
Constitution would be the most effective route for
mitigating the shareholder-regulator problem, no such
amendment has been enacted. If one were to be enacted in
the future, though, the critical question would be how to
best reconcile legitimate private concerns with public
necessity. Accordingly, scholars present a number of
strategies to best mitigate the shareholder-regulator
problem. 94 The most effective strategy, called
“privatization,” would simply prevent the federal
government from owning any stock in a corporation.95 One
such amendment has already been proposed.96 In 2009, a
Republican Representative from Ohio introduced a federal
constitutional amendment that would have prohibited the
United States government from owning any stock in
corporations.97 Responding to “government intervention in
private enterprise on a scale that many have never seen,”
93

See Pargendler, supra note 24, at 2965.
See generally id. at 2957–73 (listing one scholar’s many different
strategies).
95
See id. at 2958.
96
Press Release, House of Representatives, Rep. Mike Turner
Introduces Constitutional Amendment to Prohibit the Government from
Owning Stock in Corporations (Jun. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Press
Release].
97
Id.
94
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the representative stated that a constitutional amendment is
the “only solution” to the apparently limitless government
ability to expand its ownership of business.98
Another strategy to mitigate the shareholderregulator problem could be to disallow the federal
government from being a majority shareholder in a
corporation, as most of the more serious problems occur
when the government is a majority shareholder, thus
assuming fiduciary duties and more direct control.99 The
media has shown support for this strategy. For example,
one article in the New York Times, titled “Owner as
Regulator, Like Oil and Water,” states that “[i]f it wasn’t
already obvious, at least one reason the government
shouldn’t own controlling stakes in major companies is that
ownership and regulation are inherently incompatible.” 100
However, this approach still would not prevent the federal
government from enacting legislation to advance even its
minority interests in a corporation.
Perhaps the most feasible way to address these
issues would be a dual regulatory scheme, where wholly
private corporations would be governed by one body of
corporate law and corporations with government ownership
would be governed by a separate body of law more
narrowly tailored to address shareholder-regulator
problems. 101 By relieving private corporations from the
government’s interests as a shareholder, this strategy seems
very feasible; however, corporations with government
ownership could still be at an advantage over the ones
98

Id.
See Pargendler, supra note 24, at 2961–62.
100
James B. Stewart, Owner as Regulator, Like Oil and Water, N.Y.
TIMES,
Jan.
13,
2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/business/government-ownershipand-gm-regulation-dont-mix.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
99

101

See Pargendler, supra note 24, at 2962–68. This has also been
suggested in Brazil. Id. at 2934.
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without it, as the government could simply regulate the
corporations in which it owns stock toward a better position
in the market.102
B. Going Forward: A Case Study from Brazil
Admittedly, it would be difficult to come up with an
equitable strategy for an amendment. However, one must
wonder if such an amendment will, indeed, be needed, even
in the near future. If history ever repeats itself, the United
States could follow in Brazil’s footsteps in this regard.
Starting in the early 1920s, Brazil’s government started
buying stock in corporations within the country. 103 Just
twenty short years later, Brazil’s government started doing
so on a very large scale and as one scholar noted, “The
impetus for the creation of these [truly] national giants
came from a combination of national security
considerations in view of the ongoing world war and a lack
of private capital for financing industrialization.”104 Sound
familiar? In the 1960s, this trend had only picked up steam.
“[W]hat began as an institutional reform to promote the
low cost capitalization of private sector growth has in effect
become a vehicle for public enterprise capital
expansion.”105 By the mid-1970s, the government was a
controlling shareholder in twenty-two of the top twentyfive companies in Brazil. 106 Shortly thereafter, Brazil
entered a period of financial crisis, and the country used
corporations it was a controlling shareholder in as
instruments to effectively carry out the macroeconomic
102

See id. at 2963.
See id. at 2932.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 2934 (quoting José Roberto Mendonça de Barros & Douglas
H. Graham, The Brazilian Economic Miracle Revisited: Private and
Public Sector Initiative in a Market Economy, 13 LATIN AM. RES. REV.
5, 21 (1978)).
106
Id.
103

79

Spring 2016 | Volume 11 | Issue: 1
Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 80
policies of the country.107After decades of corporate law
reform and failure, in 2000, a Brazilian stock exchange
finally took a new approach to the shareholder-regulator
problems that were amidst the past few decades and created
different standards for wholly private corporations and
corporations with government equity ownership. 108 The
response: a dramatic capital expansion.109 Thus, Brazil’s
dual regulatory scheme to help mitigate the shareholderregulator problems achieved the end advanced by this
article, although by different means.
VII. States-Based Response: Is It Time for an
Amendment to States’ Constitutions?
If Congress is unwilling, either statutorily or
constitutionally, to explore the possibility of addressing the
shareholder-regulatory problems—and, thus, is unwilling to
rein in some of this seemingly unwieldy regulatory
power—states could go so far as to amend their own
constitutions to prevent the federal government from
intervening in private enterprises within their respective
state. Specifically, states could enact a constitutional
provision preventing the federal government from owning
stock in a corporation incorporated in their states.
With the 2008 financial crisis and the federal
government’s de facto control of corporations looming in
the minds of state legislatures, some states are, in fact,
considering such constitutional provisions.110 Kansas was
the first state in the country to propose such an

107

See id. at 2935–36.
See id. at 2940–41.
109
Id. at 2941.
110
See KANSAS OFFICE OF SECURITIES COMMISSIONER, Economic
Freedom Amendment: A States-based Response to Nationalization and
Bailouts, http://ksc.ks.gov/index.aspx?NID=187.
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amendment. 111 The Kansas Securities Commissioner has
argued for a privatization amendment to the Kansas state
constitution, which would “shield holders of private
property from nationalization of business by the federal
government.” 112 He said that Congress’s bailout efforts
permitted the federal government to own stock in nine
hundred Kansas businesses, including seventeen banks.113
Furthermore, the proposed amendment would “protect nongovernment shareholders in these companies from being
exposed to the unique risks created when the federal
government becomes a controlling shareholder of private
companies” in that it would “realign[] state and federal
economic policies with [Kansas] founding principles by
limiting the federal government to its proper role as a
neutral regulator rather than a vested owner of private
enterprise.”114
Additionally, scholars have proposed an expanded
legal framework for federal ownership of private stock.115
111

See Tim Carpenter, Kansas Securities Regulator Pushing
Constitutional Amendment, THE TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL, Feb. 5,
2013,
http://m.cjonline.com/news/business/2013-02-05/kansassecurities-regulator-pushing-constitutional-amendment. The proposed
amendment to the Kansas Constitution reads as follows: “Any transfer
to the United States, or any entity controlled by the United States, of
any ownership interest in any entity formed pursuant to the laws of this
state shall be prohibited, provided, the foregoing prohibition shall not
apply to any investments through pension funds operated by the United
States or any entity controlled by the United States.” Press Release,
supra note 96.
112
Carpenter, supra note 111.
113
Id.
114
Jack, supra note 58, at 38.
115
Id. at 36. However, one scholar concludes that, while governmental
ownership of private enterprise is “inherently unstable,” nevertheless,
because he believes that instances of government ownership are likely
to be rare in the future due to the political and legal atmosphere, “there
is no need at this point to wade into the debate about whether
government ownership is ever appropriate, and if so, under what
circumstances it is justified.” Steven M. Davidoff, Uncomfortable
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However, because federal law enacted after the financial
crisis has not addressed any of the shareholder-regulator
problems, these scholars are also proposing that there be
amendments to state constitutions to address the
concerns.116
A. Constitutionality of Such an Amendment
i. Supremacy Clause
A proposed state amendment naturally raises the
issue of constitutionality, as the Supremacy Clause “assures
that the Constitution and federal laws and treaties take
precedence over state law and binds all judges to adhere to
that principle in their courts.”117 However, pertinent to the
issue at hand, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a state’s interest in regulating its corporations was
sufficient to uphold a state law prohibiting certain types of
share transfers, 118 so perhaps a state constitutional
amendment preventing (or even minimizing) a stateincorporated constitution from transferring shares to the
federal government would be constitutional as well.
Further, in United States v. Burnison, the Supreme Court
upheld a state statute that prevented testamentary transfers

Embrace: Federal Corporate Ownership in the Midst of the Financial
Crisis, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1733, 1736, 1773–74 (2010–2011)
(illustrating the lax approach some take towards the issue).
116
Jack, supra note 58, at 36.
117
ORIGINAL TEXT AND EXPLANATION, CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.
senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm.(last visited July
28, 2016).
118
See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987);
see also Keven Garden, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America: A
State’s Right to Tend to its Tender Offers, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 947, 950
(1988).
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of real and personal property to the United States.119 There,
the Court acknowledged that a state does not have
unlimited authority to restrict transfer of property but found
that nothing in the Supremacy Clause “prohibit[ed] the
state from preventing its domiciliary from willing property
to the Federal Government.”120 There are many political
and historical reasons to honor donative intent.121 Thus, the
Supreme Court’s perceived state interest for justifying a
disregard of donative intent must have been quite strong.
Along these same lines, a state’s interest in preventing the
federal government from buying shares in corporations
incorporated in its state could be deemed an equally strong
justification for disregarding shareholder intent.
ii. Dormant Commerce Clause
A proposed state amendment restricting the transfer
of stock to the federal government would also raise
Dormant Commerce Clause issues, as such an amendment
would restrict commerce among the states. In CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., the Supreme Court was faced with
a similar issue. 122 There, the Court stated that “recent
Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated statutes that
may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting
activities to inconsistent regulations.”123 The Court added,
though, that the statute at issue did not precipitate such an
119

See 339 U.S. 87, 93 (1950) (holding that the state has broad power
to say what is devisable and to whom it may be given).
120
Id.
121
For example, honoring donor intent is consistent with a system of
private property; it encourages and rewards a life of hard work; it is
consistent with and promotes family ties; it encourages individuals to
accumulate wealth for old age and give to family; and it encourages
family members to love, serve, and protect their elders. PETER
WENDEL, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 3 (Aspen Publishers 2005).
122
See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88–89.
123
Id. at 88.
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adverse effect because each state was only allowed to
regulate rights of the corporations incorporated in its own
state, subjecting each corporation to the law of only one
state.124 Further, the Court also held that “a State has an
interest in promoting stable relationships among parties
involved in the corporations it charters, as well as in
ensuring that investors in such corporations have an
effective voice in corporate affairs,” adding that the statute
at issue furthered such interests by allowing the
shareholders to decide for themselves whether a substantial
corporate transaction was advantageous to them. 125 One
scholar said:
The proposed constitutional amendment is
similar to the . . . statute that was affirmed in
CTS. First, it applies evenly to both residents
and non-residents of an adopting state.
Second, it only applies to [corporations]
formed under the adopting state’s law.
Third, states have a strong interest in
protecting shareholders [as well as]
corporations formed under state law.126
In light of this holding, a state constitutional
amendment could potentially withstand analysis under the
Dormant Commerce Clause and therefore prevent the
federal government from owning stock in a corporation.
Perhaps a state constitutional amendment would pass
constitutional muster if it generally prevented federal
government ownership but also allowed the shareholders of
each corporation to elect whether to bypass the
124

See id. at 89 (stating that “[n]o principle of corporation law and
practice is more firmly established than a State’s authority to regulate
domestic corporations . . . .”).
125
Id. at 91.
126
Jack, supra note 58, at 37.
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constitutional protection, thus letting the shareholders
determine for themselves, much like in CTS.
iii. Takings Clause
Lastly, a proposed state amendment raises the issue
of the Takings Clause, as preventing shareholders from
transferring shares to the federal government, therefore
restricting free ownership, could be viewed as a taking.127
Justice Holmes once opined that “compensation must be
provided when government regulation ‘goes too far’ in
diminishing the value of private property.”128 Would
preventing a shareholder from selling shares to the federal
government diminish the value of the shares enough to
trigger the Takings Clause warrant some type of “just
compensation”? Traditionally, the Takings Clause has only
applied to real property and not personal property.129 In
fact, personal property has been treated as being ‘“less
protected from regulatory takings than real property.”130 As
equity in a corporation is undoubtedly personal property,
the Takings Clause is unlikely to apply and therefore no
just compensation would be needed.
VIII. Conclusion
The government, whether state or federal, owning
stock in private businesses clearly has created, and
127

Securities have been deemed to be personal property subject to the
Takings Clause. See generally In re Heldor Indus. 139 B.R. 290 (D.N.J.
1992) (overturned on other grounds).
128
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 782
(1995) (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
129
Jack, supra note 58, at 37.
130
Id. (quoting Bridget C. E. Dooling, Take It Past the Limit:
Regulatory Takings of Personal Property, 16 FED. CIR. B.J. 445, 446
(2007)).
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continues to create, shareholder-regulator problems. If not
reined in sooner rather than later, there is no guarantee that
the federal government will not simply continue owning
more stock in private corporations and thus continue
exhibiting inappropriate control, in light of the inherent
problems associated with the roles of shareholder and
regulator, over the corporations. A federal constitutional
amendment or a state constitutional amendment is needed
to prevent what happened in Brazil from happening here in
America. Such an amendment is needed to ensure that the
federal government does not reach too far into the realm of
private enterprises and capital markets. Time will tell how
much more the federal government will use private
enterprises as its pawns, but one thing is for certain: if left
unchecked, the federal government is not unlikely to be
nice and play by the rules on its own.
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ARTICLE
DEATH BY JURY: JURISPRUDENTIAL TRENDS AND HYBRID
CAPITAL SENTENCING AUTHORITY
By: Jacob T. Hayes1
I. Introduction
American imposition of the death penalty has taken
on varying forms in the several states since the invalidation
of many state capital punishment procedures in Furman v.
Georgia.2 In the process of redrafting capital punishment
statutes in an effort to make sentencing more consistent,
state legislators grappled with the issue of final punishment
and whether the judge or the jury took on the responsibility
of that decision.3 Leading up to the turn of the century, of
the thirty-eight states that imposed the death penalty,
twenty-nine of them gave sentencing authority to the jury
with little or no supervision by the trial judge.4 Five states
left sentencing to the judge, and four states (Florida,
Alabama, Indiana, and Delaware) maintained a “hybrid”
system, where the jury made the determination on capital
punishment subject to a judicial override. 5 Within these
“hybrid” states, the jury made the decision at trial whether
to impose life imprisonment without parole or death, but
the judge could then potentially override the jury decision
based on a weighing of “aggravating” and “mitigating”
1

J.D. Candidate 2018, The University of Tennessee College of Law
See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 240 (1972).
3
See William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles, & Michael E.
Antonio, The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of
the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty
Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 932 (2006).
4
See id. at 933.
5
Id.
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factors. 6 Most notably, the jury did not have a role
regarding the presence of aggravating factors or the lack of
mitigating factors in this sentencing stage.7
It was in this context that the Supreme Court
decided Ring v. Arizona, a Sixth Amendment challenge to
Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme.8 This decision, which
extended the jury fact-finding responsibilities articulated by
the Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey, invalidated outright
judge-only sentencing of the death penalty in those five
states utilizing that scheme. 9 The question remained,
however, regarding the constitutionality of the judicial
override in place in the hybrid states.10 The Supreme Court
answered this question in January of 2016 through Hurst v.
Florida, a direct challenge to Florida’s judicial override of
jury decisions in a capital punishment case.11 This recent
decision has several implications regarding the jury’s role
in sentencing, and it may in fact lead to an overall shift in
the imposition of the death penalty in the United States.
In this policy note, I will attempt to track the
jurisprudential trends within the American courts to better
understand the state of capital punishment and its
imposition in the future. The key issue at the heart of these
recent decisions lies in the sentencing roles of the judge and
the jury. I contend that, since Apprendi and Ring, the courts
have shifted from judicial authority in sentencing to an
expanded role and increased responsibility for the jury.
Moreover, in light of Hurst, I will discuss what role the
6

ALA. CODE § 13A–5–47 (1981); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(d)(1) (2013), FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2015).
7
See Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 620 (2016) (quoting FLA. STAT. §
921.141(3) (2015)).
8
See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002).
9
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 609; see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 492 (2000).
10
See Ring, 536 at 609 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (expressing concerns
that hybrid schemes remained unresolved by the majority).
11
See generally Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616.
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jury takes on in these hybrid states, specifically in the
finding of “aggravating” factors. If the jury is now
experiencing nearly total authority in decision-making for
capital cases, what does this mean for the death penalty and
its imposition in general? I conclude that the expanded role
of the jury, coupled with public views on the death penalty
indicated by recent polling, may result in fewer defendants
sentenced to death, creating a significant shift in American
imposition of capital punishment.
II. Development of the Law: The Role of the Jury in
Capital Punishment Sentencing
The Supreme Court expressed appreciation for the
jury in Duncan v. Louisiana, stating that jury trial
provisions in federal and state constitutions “reflect a
fundamental decision about the exercise of official
power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life
and liberty of the citizen to one judge or to a group of
judges.”12 This position suggests the jury as a buffer, a
populist check to the state’s ability to impose judgment on
private citizens—a tradition going back to common law
England.13 The role of the jury in American courts is thusly
situated, with the Bill of Rights ensuring the right to a jury
as such a buffer against the will of the state. 14
Unfortunately, the jury’s responsibilities as a fact-finder,
specifically in capital sentencing schemes, were initially
not so clearly defined.15

12

Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
See Welsh S. White, Fact-Finding and the Death Penalty: The Scope
of a Capital Defendant’s Right to Jury Trial, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1, 3–4 (1989) (noting that Sir Blackstone refers to the English jury as
the grand “palladium” of English liberty says that “competent . . .
jurymen” are the guardians of public justice.)
14
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
15
See White, supra note 13, at 4.
13
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The Supreme Court has heard several key cases that
dealt directly with sentencing in capital punishment,
beginning in the early seventies and continuing to January
2016.16 In 1970, the Court, in In re Winship, ruled that the
reasonable doubt standard, applied to those facts found by
the jury, was a required element of constitutional due
process. 17 Post-Furman, the Court heard constitutional
challenges to judge-determined sentencing enhancements,
most notably Walton v. Arizona. 18 In Walton, the Court
examined the constitutionality of an Arizona statute
allowing a judge to determine whether the jury’s guilty
verdict in a capital murder case should carry a sentence of
life imprisonment or death.19 The statute directed the judge
to determine the existence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances relevant to the imposition of the death
penalty.20 The defendant in Walton contended that the jury
should make that determination, but the Court disagreed,
holding that “aggravating circumstances” constituted a
sentencing guide rather than elements of an offense, and
thus were not constitutionally required to be heard by a
jury.21
The Supreme Court in Apprendi took this
determination a step further, holding that any fact that
increases the statutorily prescribed maximum penalty must
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 22 The case
specifically involved a challenge to a sentence
enhancement if the judge determined that a defendant acted
with racial prejudice. 23 The majority viewed this
16

See generally Hurst, 136 S. Ct. 616.
See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
18
See generally, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990); Jones v.
United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
19
See Walton, 497 U.S. at 642–43.
20
See id. at 643.
21
Id. at 647–49.
22
See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
23
See id. at 470.
17
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determination, which potentially doubled the defendant’s
sentence, as seeking a specific mens rea and therefore could
not stand as a simple sentencing guideline. 24 In an
interesting break from previous decisions, the Apprendi
court seemingly dismissed the distinction between
“elements” and “sentencing factors” and placed on the jury
all fact-finding responsibilities that will impact the
defendant’s punishment.25 The Court saw the jury’s duty as
one “not of form, but effect,” and stated that any labels
placed on a particular fact are irrelevant if that fact is
essential to the imposition of a sentence and it exposes the
defendant to greater punishment.26 The Apprendi decision
represented a significant shift in responsibility from judge
to jury in sentencing, a shift that at the time was logically at
odds with precedent of Walton. 27 The Court seized the
opportunity to resolve issues with precedent two years later
in Ring v. Arizona.28
The defendant in Ring faced the death penalty under
the same statutory scheme as the defendant in Walton,
wherein he was found guilty of first-degree felony murder
by the jury and subsequently sentenced to death by the
judge due to certain “aggravating factors.” 29 Justice
Ginsberg, in delivering the opinion of the Court, directly
addressed the irreconcilability of Walton and Apprendi,
ultimately endorsing the Apprendi reasoning and overruling
Walton. 30 Any fact, noted the Court, that subjects the

24

See id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
26
Id. But see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1997)
(stipulating that history of prior convictions exposing a defendant to
greater punishment did not require review by the jury).
27
See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 536–37.
28
See Ring, 536 U.S. at 590.
29
See id. at 591–94.
30
See id. at 604–05 (“Apprendi repeatedly instructs in that context that
the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an ‘element’ or a
25
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defendant to a greater punishment must be reviewed by a
jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.31 This included
Arizona’s sentencing enhancement of “aggravating factors”
because the maximum penalty for the felony murder verdict
issued by the jury was life imprisonment, but the defendant
was then subjected to a harsher penalty of death after the
judge considered additional facts related to the case.32 This
scheme, according to the majority, violated the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 33 Effectively invalidating judge-only
sentencing in the five states that possessed such a
procedure, the Ring decision expanded the scope of
Apprendi to capital punishment cases and marked a
significant shift in sentencing responsibility from the judge
to the jury.34
III. Current Policy – Substantive Law at Issue
A. Legal Issue Presented
The cases at issue in Apprendi, Ring, and more
strike at the heart of a debate guiding capital punishment
jurisprudence since Furman: who reserves the right to
punish a defendant, the people or the state? 35 Are
“sentencing enhancements” (such as a determination of
aggravating factors by a judge) state attempts at eroding the
jury’s role in the imposition of capital punishment? In each
‘sentencing factor’ is not determinative of the question ‘who decides,’
judge or jury.”).
31
See id. at 602.
32
See id. at 597.
33
See id. at 609.
34
See Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Application of Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000)
and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556
(2002) to State Death Penalty Proceedings, 110 A.L.R.5th 1, § 2a
(2003).
35
See White, supra note 13, at 2.
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case examined above, the petitioner sought to have a jury
of his peers render the final judgment, not the court.
Relying on constitutional imperatives, these petitioners
asserted that protections from state-sanctioned punishment
are baked into the Bill of Rights.36 If the state is given the
right to create laws and punish human behavior, then the
jury, a cross-section of the society, ensures that state
administration of justice will be rendered by members of
the community and not a singular official.37 Conversely, the
statutes forming the basis of judicial sentencing schemes
were intended to resolve the issues of Furman and remove
the arbitrary administration of capital punishment by
juries.38 The goal was to satisfy the (possibly paradoxical)
aims of consistency and individualization in sentencing by
allowing impartial judges to be the final word in the
imposition of capital punishment.39 States arguing to keep
their judicial sentencing schemes maintain that the judge is
better equipped, in both academics and experience, to
provide the most beneficial administration of justice in
society.40
Based on the Apprendi and Ring decisions, it seems
that the Court is falling on the side of the jury in this issue.
By requiring that “aggravating factors” and other sentence
enhancements be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Court is, in effect, forcing states to include the jury in
nearly every aspect of capital sentencing. By increasing
jury involvement, and therefore allowing for more
conflicting opinions regarding the proper administration of
36

See Ring, 536 U.S. at 595; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471.
See Witherspoon v. State, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968).
38
See K. Brent Tomer, Ring Around the Grand Jury: Informing Grand
Jurors of the Capital Consequences of Aggravating Facts, 17 CAP.
DEF. J. 61, 70 (2004); see also Steven Semeraro, Responsibility in
Capital Sentencing, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79, 94–95 (2002)
(describing the twin goals as consistency and individualization).
39
See Tomer, supra note 38, at 70.
40
See id. at 73.
37
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justice, the courts potentially could see more “arbitrary”
sentencing. Moreover, the Court views the constitutional
basis for the jury’s authority as an intentional safeguard
against failures in state sentencing, and while jury
sentencing tends to be more arbitrary, it seems the Court is
willing to tolerate that arbitrariness in favor of preventing
the erosion of public rights to a jury trial.41
A. Hurst v. Florida
It is within that framework that the Supreme Court
discussed “hybrid” sentencing schemes in Hurst v. Florida.
In the years following the Ring decision, those state
procedures rendered invalid were redrafted to include the
jury as fact finder when determining “aggravating factors,”
but the so-called “hybrid” states did not experience any
changes to their sentencing schemes.42 There were attempts
to challenge these hybrid procedures before the Supreme
Court prior to Apprendi (most notably Hildwin v. Florida),
but no challenge successfully invalidated the hybrid
scheme until Hurst in 2016.43 The defendant in Hurst faced
the death penalty after the jury found him guilty of firstdegree murder and recommended the death sentence after
consideration of aggravating factors.44 The trial judge then
concurred in this recommendation after considering
aggravating factors independently.45 The Court, in keeping
41

See Ring, 536 U.S. at 607; see also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498
(Scalia, J., concurring).
42
Recent Case: Criminal Procedure – Sixth Amendment – Alabama
Supreme Court Upholds a Death Sentence Imposed by Judicial
Override by a Jury Recommendation for Life Imprisonment Without
Parole: Ex parte Hodges, 856 So. 2d 936 (Ala. 2003), 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1283 (2004); see generally Winbush, supra note 34 at § 20.
43
But see Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989) (upholding Florida
hybrid scheme), overruled by Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 621
(2016).
44
See Hurst, 136 S. Ct. at 620.
45
See id.
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with Ring and Apprendi, determined that Florida’s
sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial as well as constitutional due process.46
As in Ring, the required finding of an aggravated
circumstance exposed the defendant to a greater
punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict
and, as a result, a jury determination of fact was necessary
for the imposition of the death penalty. 47 The Court
acknowledged that the Florida scheme did afford the jury
an advisory verdict, contrasting the Arizona scheme in
Ring, but nonetheless found this distinction irrelevant
because the judge maintained the ability to override a jury
verdict based on her own independent determination of
aggravating factors.48 In making this decision, the Court
invalidated Florida’s hybrid sentencing scheme as a
violation of the Sixth Amendment and, in so doing, the
Court potentially rendered unconstitutional similar schemes
in states such as Alabama and Delaware.49
IV. Analysis – The Implications of Hurst on Capital
Punishment Sentencing
The Hurst court extended the reasoning of Apprendi
to a sentencing procedure that allowed a judicial role in
fact-finding and shifted ultimate responsibility to the jury in
a previously hybrid scheme. Moreover, the implications of
this shift suggest a resolution to the issue of judicial
imposition of capital punishment. Of the thirty-eight states
that impose a death penalty, thirty-five of them now include
the jury in the sentencing phase, and pending revisions to
the Florida statute this spring, that total will rise to thirty-

46

See id. at 621–22.
See id. at 622.
48
See id. at 621.
49
See id. at 620–21.
47
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six.50 Only Alabama and Delaware still maintain a hybrid
system.51
Over the past several years, American approval of
the death penalty has had several peaks and valleys, with
approval being at its highest in 1994 at eighty percent.52
More recently, however, polling indicates a shift towards
public disapproval of the death penalty.53 Polls released by
the Pew Research Center and Columbia Broadcasting
System (“CBS”) News in April of 2015 showed public
support for the death penalty at fifty-six percent, near the
lowest level recorded in the last forty years.54 According to
the November 2015 American Values Survey of 2,695
Americans, fifty-two percent preferred the imposition of
life without parole rather than death.55 In light of these
polling numbers, the implications on the opinions of future
juries in capital punishment cases are very interesting. If
50

See Bowers, supra note 3, at 933 (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 608 n.6);
see also Casey C. Sullivan, Florida’s Capital Punishment Sentencing Is
Unconstitutional, THE FINDLAW U.S. SUPREME COURT NEWS &
INFORMATION
BLOG
(Jan.
12,
2016,
1:50
PM),
blogs.findlaw.com/supreme_court
/2016/01/floridas-capitalpunishment-sentencing-is-unconstitutional.html
(considering
the
implications of the Hurst decision nationally).
51
See ALA. CODE § 13ª–5–47 (1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
4209(d)(1) (2013).
52
See GALLUP, www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last
visited Jan. 25, 2016).
53
See id. Polling indicates that in the last decade disapproval of the
death penalty among Americans has increased at a significant rate,
increasing from twenty-six percent to thirty-seven percent since 2000.
54
See Less Support for Death Penalty, Especially Among Democrats,
PEW
RES. CTR. (April
16,
2015),
http://www.peoplepress.org/2015/04/16/less-support-for-death-penalty-especially-amongdemocrats/.
55
See Anxiety, Nostalgia, and Mistrust: Findings from the 2015
American Values Survey, PUBLIC RELIGION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (Nov.
17, 2015), http://publicreligion.org/research/2015/11/survey-anxietynostalgia-and-mistrust-findings-from-the-2015-american-valuessurvey/#.VqaDyPkrKUm.
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the jury is to be a cross-section of society, reflecting the
public opinion, then more and more jurors may find
themselves unwilling to impose the death penalty on
defendants.
Interestingly, the invalidation of the hybrid scheme
may have additional impact in the number of death
sentences ordered. Of the top fifteen states that imposed the
death penalty in 2015, Florida and Alabama, hybrid states,
were second and third, respectively.56 Closer examination
of the jurors in these hybrid states reveals important facts
that suggest increased jury authority will lead to fewer
death sentences. Data collected by the Capital Jury Project
(“CJP”) in 2005 provided multiple examples of juror
opinions on imposing death in an actual case, specifically
by comparing statements from jurors in jury-only
sentencing states with those in hybrid states.57 The resulting
facts revealed that jurors in a hybrid state, where they were
specifically instructed as providing a recommendation to
the judge and not an actual sentence, were much more
likely to impose the death sentence knowing they did not
bear ultimate responsibility for the defendant’s fate. 58
These hybrid jurors were also much more likely to
misunderstand the court’s instructions, take less time in
deliberation, and refrain from asking for clarification or
additional testimony.59
56

See States in Order of Number of Death Sentences – 2015, DEATH
PENALTY
INFORMATION
CENTER
(2015),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/2015-sentencing#2014topstates.
57
See William J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles, & Michael
E. Antonio, The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical Examination of
the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty
Decision-Making, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 931, 951–52 (2006). A
total of 1198 interviews with jurors from 353 capital trials in fourteen
states were conducted. These fourteen states were responsible for over
seventy-six percent of persons on death row as of January 1, 2005.
58
See id. at 956.
59
See id. at 960–74. In Alabama, a hybrid state, nearly forty percent of
jurors concluded deliberations in a capital punishment case within one
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Narrative accounts taken from jurors in Alabama,
Florida, and Indiana showed general feelings of detachment
from the defendant and of being “off the hook” for
whatever became of the individual standing trial.60 The data
collected by CJP suggests that providing full responsibility
for sentencing to juries may lead to more deliberative and
considerate decision-making from the jurors, suggesting a
diminishing rate of state executions and thus changing the
nature of capital punishment in the United States in the
future.
V. Conclusion
The sentencing role in capital punishment has had
its fair share of deliberation in our nation’s highest Court,
and over the decades since Furman, the Court’s opinion has
shifted on the importance of jury sentencing. Following the
decisions in Apprendi, Ring, and now Hurst, the way
Americans impose capital punishment has been firmly
situated with the jury. This jurisprudential shift adds to the
debate surrounding the death penalty by placing
responsibility for its imposition on the people. Moreover,
this “conscience of the community” is growing less fond of
the death penalty every year. Fewer and fewer Americans
favor the death penalty as a punishment and, in the future,
these same individuals will make up juries across the
hour. Thirty-eight percent of Florida jurors concluded deliberations
within one hour, and in Indiana twenty-eight percent of jurors
concluded deliberations within an hour. By contrast, in California, a
jury-only state and the largest number of inmates on death row, only
seven percent of jurors decided within an hour
60
Id. at 961–63. Contrasting these figures with those from jury-only
sentencing states shows a wide gulf in juror opinions and weight of
responsibility. Those jurors that understood their verdict was the
ultimate determination were much more likely to ask for clarification,
deliberate for several hours or days, and give added consideration to
mitigating factors in a capital punishment case.
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nation. By placing sentencing authority on the jury, the
Court effectively gave final say on the imposition of death
to this “arbitrary” cross-section of the community.
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